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IV.

JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. 78-3-2(3) (j) .
V.
A.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Whether the trial court has complied with the Court of

Appeals' mandate

to enter detailed

consistent

findings on the

elements required for recovery for unjust enrichment.
This issue presents a mixed question of fact and law.

The

trial court's factual findings are subject to a "clearly erroneous"
standard of review under which deference is given to the trial
court's findings, and disputed evidence is resolved in a light most
favorable to the trial court's determination.

The trial court's

application of the law to the facts is subject to a "correctness"
standard under which no deference is given to the trial court's
decision.

State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932 (Utah 1994) . This issue was

preserved in Appellant's letter to the court dated May 6, 1996 (R.
1068-70),

and

in

the

accompanying

Objections

to

Plaintiff's

Proposed Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

(R.

1071-86).
B.

Whether there is substantial evidence in the record to

support the trial court's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.
This issue presents a question of fact subject to a "clearly
erroneous" standard of review under which deference is given to the
trial court's findings, and disputed evidence is resolved in a
light most favorable to the trial court's determination.
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State v.

Pena,

869 P. 2d 932.

This issue was preserved

in Appellants'

Objections to Plaintiff's Proposed Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
C.

(R. 1071-86).

Whether the trial court's Amended Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law satisfy the elements for recovery in quasicontract .
This issue presents a mixed question of fact and law.

The

trial court's factual findings are subject to a "clearly erroneous"
standard under which deference is given to the trial court.

The

trial court's application of the law to the facts is subject to a
"correctness" standard under which no deference should be given to
the trial court's decision.
issue

was

preserved

State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932.

in Appellants'

Objections

to

This

Plaintiff's

Proposed Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

(R. 1071

at 1081-82) .
D.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Bailey-

Allen was entitled to an award for unjust enrichment for counting
and renegotiating the price of the lumber and, if not, whether the
trial court applied the correct method to determine the amount by
which Kurzets had been unjustly enriched.
The issue of whether Bailey-Allen was entitled to an award for
unjust enrichment presents a mixed question of fact and law.

The

trial court's factual findings are subject to a "clearly erroneous"
standard under which deference is given to the trial court.

The

trial court's application of the law to the facts is subject to a
"correctness" standard under which no deference should be given to
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the trial court's decision.

State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932. Whether

a court's theory of recovery is sound is a question of law to be
reviewed for correctness. Bailey Allen v. Kurzet, 876 P. 2d at 421,
424; Van Dvke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1991).

This issue

was preserved in Appellants' Objections to Plaintiff's Proposed
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

(R. 1071 at

1080) .
E.

Whether the portion of the original judgment in favor of

Kurzets that Bailey-Allen failed to appeal in the first appeal
should be entered as of October 6, 1992, and whether post-judgment
interest should accrue on the award from that date.
This

issue

presents

a

question

of

law

subject

to

a

"correctness" standard of review. Bailey Allen v. Kurzet, 876 P. 2d
at 424; State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).

This issue was

preserved in Appellants' Motion for Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc
and accompanying Memorandum (R. 934-48), and in their Objections to
Plaintiff's Proposed Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

(R. 1071 at 1083-84).
F.

Whether

the

trial

court

erred

in

failing

to

impose

sanctions under Rule 11, after finding from the bench that BaileyAllen had no cause to file the pleading that was the subject of
Kurzets' Rule 11 motion.
The

legal conclusion that no sanctions were warranted

is

subject to a "correctness" standard of review. Barnard v. Sutliff,
646 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1992); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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The amount and type of sanction to be

3

imposed is subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard.
Id.

This

issue

was

preserved

in

Appellants'

Objections

to

Plaintiff's Proposed Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

(R. 1071 at 1082-83).
VI.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES

Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The text of the rule

is set forth verbatim in Addendum I, attached hereto.
VII.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action arose out of a construction contract under which
appellee Bailey-Allen Company, Inc. ("Bailey-Allen") was to perform
certain work building a house for appellants

("Kurzets").

The

parties had several disputes about the project and, eventually,
Kurzets terminated Bailey-Allen.

Bailey-Allen sued Kurzets for

breach of contract, for damages under the Mechanic's Lien Statute
and Construction Bond Statute, and for unjust enrichment.

Kurzets

counterclaimed against Bailey-Allen for damages incurred in having
to correct several construction errors caused by Bailey-Allen.
Bailey-Allen was awarded damages for unjust enrichment and
Kurzets were awarded damages for construction errors.
judgment was in favor of Bailey-Allen.
judgment

The Kurzets appealed the

to the Court of Appeals which reversed

Bailey-Allen

and

instructed

the

court

The net

to

enter

the award
findings

to
and

conclusions consistent with the Court of Appeals' opinion.

The

trial

and

court,

on

June

11, 1996,

Conclusion and an Amended Judgment.
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entered

Amended

Findings

Kurzets again appeal the case,

contending that the trial court has failed to follow the Court of
Appeals' mandate.
VIII.

RELEVANT FACTS

On or about July 3, 1990, Kurzets and Bailey-Allen entered
into an agreement

(R. 009-011) (hereinafter "Contract"), whereby

Bailey-Allen

as

general

construction

of

Kurzets'

"Project").
things,

that

insurance

contractor
residence

(R. 214-15).
Bailey-Allen

coverage

The

agreed
in

Park

Contract

would

to

provide

for the Project, that

oversee

City,

provided,
evidence

the

Utah
among
of

(the
other

adequate

it would act as the

general contractor, and that it would supervise and direct the
construction. Id.

In return, Kurzets agreed to pay all costs of

labor and material including twenty-two dollars ($22) per hour the
hands-on labor of Bailey-Allen's employees and, upon completion of
the Project, to pay Bailey-Allen one hundred thousand dollars for
general

contractor

services

of

directing

and

supervising

the

construction. Id.
On October 2, 1990, Kurzets terminated Bailey-Allen from the
Project

for

failing

to produce

evidence of

insurance

failing to adequately perform as general contractor.

and

for

Bailey-Allen

filed a mechanic's lien, brought an action to foreclose the lien
and an action for failure to obtain a construction bond, and sought
to recover damages under the contract and under a theory of unjust
enrichment, seeking one hundred thousand dollars in damages as its
fee for directing and supervising the construction. (R. 001-008) .
On September 24, 1991, the trial court granted Kurzets' motion for
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summary judgment on Bailey-Allen's claim for unjust enrichment, and
claims under the mechanic's lien and construction bond statutes,
and ordered that the mechanic's lien be discharged. (R. 127-28).
The

remaining

contract

claim

was

tried

at

the

bench

on

December 18 and 19, 1991, and on January 30, 1992. (R. 3 05) . During
the trial, the court sua sponte, reinstated the cause of action for
unjust enrichment over Kurzets' objection.

(R. 543-45) .

At the

conclusion of trial, the court issued its ruling from the bench.
(R. 797-806).

The court instructed Kurzets to submit proposed

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a proposed Judgment
based on the court's verbal ruling. Id.

On October 6, 1992, the

court adopted Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and entered
judgment.

(R. 214-22)

("Original Findings and Conclusions" and

"Original Judgment" respectively) (a copy of the Original Findings
and Conclusions is attached as Addendum A ) .
The trial court concluded that Kurzets were not in breach of
the Contract in any way. (R. 218) . It concluded that Kurzets were
justified in terminating Bailey-Allen because Bailey-Allen failed
to provide evidence of insurance as required under the Contract (R.
216) , and because Bailey-Allen "spent very few hours on the job
site and did not give the construction project the attention it
required under the contract and that plaintiff knew Mr. Kurzet
would expect."

(R. 215-17).

Nevertheless, the trial court awarded Bailey-Allen damages "in
quantum meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract. . ." (R.
218), reasoning that Kurzets had received a $10,000 benefit from
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Bailey-Allen's

pre-termination

services

"regardless

of

whether

[Bailey-Allen] performed its duties under the contract." (R. 216) .
The trial court al so awarded Bailey-Allen $5,500.00 based on the
savings that Bailey-Allen achieved by counting and negotiating the
price of some lumber that had been delivered to the construction
site before Kurzets and Bailey-Allen entered into the Contract. (R.
218) .

Finally,

Bailey-Allen

was

awarded

its

costs,

and

pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on the award. The Original
Judgment in favor of Bailey-Allen was offset by a judgment in favor
of Kurzets in the amount of $4,359.00 representing damages due to
Bailey-Allen's faulty construction and its ordering unnecessary
materials.

(R. 220-222).

(Original Judgment, October 6, 1992,

attached as Addendum B ) .
After unsuccessfully moving the trial court to alter or amend
the Original Judgment (R. 266), Kurzets filed an appeal* (R. 294) .
Bailey-Allen did not cross-appeal.

On the first appeal, Kurzets

claimed that the court had misapplied the law by awarding damages
for

the

contractor's

fee

and

for

negotiating

the

lumber;

by

awarding pre-judgment and post-judgment interest to Bailey-Allen,
and by failing to award attorney fees to Kurzets for prevailing on
the mechanic's lien cause of action. (R. 809-815).
The Court of Appeals reversed

the award

to Bailey-Allen,

concluding that it was not entitled to recover damages "on the
contract" because

there was no evidence

performed under the contract. (R. 811(a)).
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that

it

substantially

(Opinion of the Utah

Court of Appeals, attached as Addendum C) . *

The Court also held

that while an award in quasi-contract might be appropriate, the
trial court had not entered findings sufficient to allow the Court
to determine whether recovery was warranted.

(R. 812). The Court

of Appeals also reversed the award to Bailey-Allen of pre-judgment
interest and held that post-judgment interest, if a judgment was
awarded on remand, should run only from the date the new judgment
on remand

is entered

(R. 813-813 (a)).

Finally,

the Court of

Appeals held that Kurzets were entitled to recover attorneys' fees
for successfully defending Bailey-Allen's cause of action under the
Mechanic's Lien Statute.

(R. 814 (a)). The Court of Appeals did

not disturb the award of damages to Kurzets that had comprised the
"offsets" against the judgment in favor of Bailey-Allen.

(R. 812) .

On November 1, 1994, after the case had been remitted to
district court, Kurzets moved the district court for attorney fees
and costs pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals.
844).

(R.

On November 18, the parties jointly requested a hearing on

the motion. (R. 877) .
On November 28, 1994, after the hearing was scheduled, BaileyAllen requested a status conference before Judge Wilkinson. At the
same time, it filed an objection to Kurzets' motion for attorney
fees and costs and an objection to the scheduled hearing.

Bailey-

Allen argued that the Motion for Attorney Fees should be before

1

The Court of Appeals' Opinion has been Bates stamped with numbers 8 09
through 815 of the record. The opinion is double-sided and the reverse side of
each page has not been stamped.
References to pages of the opinion without
stamped numbers will be designated as (R.809(a)), etc.
270166 1
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Judge Wilkinson

rather than Judge Glenn

Iwasaki who was

then

presiding in Summit County. (R. 855).
On December 29, 1994, Judge Iwasaki heard argument on BaileyAllen's objections to Kurzets' motion for attorney fees.

The court

decided that the matter of attorney fees was not unique to the
knowledge of Judge Wilkinson, and that it would hear the motion.
(R. 1182-83) .

On January 23, 1995, the court entered findings of

fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in favor of Kurzets for
attorney fees and costs under the mechanic's lien statute and the
bond statute in the amount of $1,937.50 plus interest. (R. 917).
On May 12, 1995, because Bailey-Allen had not taken any action
to

bring

the

remanded

case

before

the

trial

court,

Kurzets

requested from the clerk of the court a transcript of the portion
of the Original Judgment in favor of Kurzets that had been entered
on October 6, 1992, and that had been offset against the judgment
for Bailey-Allen.

(R. 919-25).

The clerk would not issue the

transcript of judgment either because it could not determine from
the record whether the award in favor of Kurzets survived the
appeal or because it believed the case was still on appeal. (R.
919, 930) . On July 25, 1995, therefore, Kurzets filed a Motion for
Entry

of

Judgment

Nunc

Pro

Tunc

and

supporting

Memorandum

requesting the court to enter judgment for Kurzets in the amount of
$4,359.00 as of October 6, 1992, together with interest running
from that date.

(R. 934-947).

On August 25, 1995, in response to Kurzets' Motion for Entry
of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc, Bailey-Allen filed two motions, one for
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Entry of Additional

Findings of

Fact, Conclusions

of

Law

and

Judgment Pursuant to the Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals (R.
964) , and another to Set Aside the Prior Order Dismissing the
Mechanic's Lien Cause of Action and Resulting Judgment for Attorney
Fees in Favor of Defendants. (R. 962) . Kurzets replied to BaileyAllen's motions on September 18, 1995, and at the same time moved
for sanctions under Rule 11.

(R. 997).

Kurzets contended that

Bailey-Allen's Motion to Set Aside the Prior Order

Dismissing

Mechanic's Lien Cause of Action was not warranted by any existing
law or good faith argument for extending the law. (R. 997-1003).
Bailey-Allen subsequently withdrew the motion (R. 1008), but not
before Kurzets had filed a brief in opposition and a Motion for
Sanctions.

Kurzets requested that they be awarded their fees and

costs incurred in responding to Bailey-Allen's Motion to Set Aside
and in preparing the Motion for Sanctions.

(R. 1002).

On November 21, 1995, the court (Judge Wilkinson presiding)
heard oral argument on all pending motions. (R. 1010-1064).
court

granted

Bailey

Allen's

Motion

for

Entry

of

The

Additional

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, denied Kurzets' Motion for
Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc on the grounds that it was moot,
and noted that the Motion to Set Aside the Prior Order Dismissing
the Mechanic's Lien Cause of Action had been withdrawn. (R. 1060).
With respect

to Kurzets' Motion

for Sanctions, the

court

agreed that Bailey-Allen's counsel had no cause to bring the motion
before the court. (R. 1060).

The court, however, also believed

that Kurzets had improperly brought their motion for attorney fees
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before Judge Iwasaki.

(R. 1061).

Instead of awarding Kurzets'

their attorney fees or imposing other appropriate sanctions, the
court determined that the perceived impropriety of Kurzets bringing
the

motion

before

Judge Iwasaki

would

violation of Rule 11. (R. 1061).

"offset"

Bailey-Allen's

The court denied the Motion for

Sanctions. (R. 1061) (a copy of the transcript of the trial court's
ruling on the Motion for Sanctions is attached as Addendum H ) .
At the close of the hearing on November 21, 1995, the court
instructed Bailey-Allen to prepare proposed Amended Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, proposed Amended Judgment, proposed
Order Denying Motion for Sanctions and for Entry of Judgment Nunc
Pro

Tunc,

and

Attorney's Fees.

proposed

Order

Satisfying

(R. 1112-1129).

Prior

Judgment

When Bailey-Allen submitted

their proposed Amended Findings and Conclusions, Kurzets
detailed

objections

proposed Amended

(R.

1071-1087),

Findings of Fact

Re:

and

submitted

and Conclusions

filed

their
of

Law

own
and

proposed Amended Judgment (R. 1088-1101) (Kurzets' Proposed Amended
Findings and Conclusions and Proposed Amended Judgment are attached
as Addenda F and G respectively).
On June

11, 1996, a very brief

hearing was held on

the

parties' proposed Amended Findings and Conclusions (R. 1132-114 9).
At the close of the hearing, the court entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law virtually verbatim as submitted by Bailey-Allen.
(The Amended Findings and Conclusions are attached as Addendum D ) .
The court also entered Bailey-Allen's proposed Amended Judgment,
and an Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Entry of Judgment Nunc
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Pro Tunc and their Motion for Sanctions. (R. 1124-29) (the Amended
Judgment is attached as Addendum E ) .
On July 5, 1996, defendants filed a timely Notice of Appeal
from the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
Amended

Judgment,

Attorney's

the

Order

Satisfying

Prior

Judgment

re:

Fees, and the Order Denying Defendants' Motion

for

Sanctions and denying its Motion for Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro
Tunc.
IX.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Kurzets appeal from the Amended Judgment on six grounds.

A

summary of each argument follows:
A.

On the first appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the

award to Bailey-Allen because, due to the inconsistencies in the
trial court's Original Findings, it could not tell whether the
award was supported by the evidence.

It remanded the case for the

trial court to enter "detailed, consistent" findings.

(R. 812).

Because the trial court preserved the Original Findings and added
to them the Amended Findings, the inconsistencies still exist that
led

the

instance.

Court

of Appeals

to

reverse

the

award

in

the

first

The Amended Judgment for Bailey-Allen is still without

support in the Findings and Conclusions and the trial court has
failed to abide by the mandate.
B.

The

Amended

Findings

evidence in the record.

of

Fact

are

not

supported

by

In an attempt to salvage the award to

Bailey-Allen and to articulate some factual basis for it, the court
entered the proposed Amended Findings and Conclusions as submitted
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by Bailey-Allen.

Several of those Amended Findings are simply not

supportable by any evidence in the record.
may

be very

scant

evidence

Others, although there

in support, are not

supported

by

substantial credible evidence when the record is viewed as a whole.
C.

The trial court failed to follow the Court of Appeals'

instruction to allow recovery on Bailey-Allen's claim only if all
three elements for recovery in quasi-contract were satisfied.

(R.

812 (citing Davies v. Olsen, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah App. 1987)).
The first element under Davies has not been satisfied because the
trial court, as it did in its Original Findings, failed to find
that Bailey-Allen conferred any benefit on Kurzets.

Likewise, the

second element under Davies has not been satisfied because there is
insufficient

evidence

in

the

record

to

suggest

that

Kurzets

realized or appreciated any benefit from Bailey-Allen's involvement
in the Project.
because

Finally, the third element has not been satisfied

Bailey-Allen

conferred

no

benefit

on

Kurzets.

Consequently, it would not be unjust to allow Kurzets to retain the
value of the construction completed during Bailey-Allen's tenure
without paying Bailey-Allen.
D.

The trial court erred in finding that Bailey-Allen was

entitled to an award for unjust enrichment with respect to its
services in counting and negotiating the price of lumber.

The

Court of Appeals directed the trial court to determine whether
counting

and negotiating

the price of

lumber

fell within

the

services Bailey-Allen was supposed to perform under the Contract.
Although the trial court concluded that such services did not come
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within

the

decision.

Contract,

there

is

absolutely

no

basis

for

that

In addition, the amount of the award to Bailey-Allen,

which should have been based on the value of the benefit conferred,
was simply an arbitrary number.

There is no basis in the law or in

the facts for the court's decision that Bailey-Allen is entitled to
one-half of the amount it saved Kurzets.
E.

The trial court erred in denying Kurzet's Motion for

Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc.

Bailey-Allen never appealed from

the judgment in favor of Kurzets.

It became res judicata or the

law of the case, therefore, when the time for appeal had run.

The

decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the award to BaileyAllen had no effect on the portion of the judgment in favor of
Kurzets.

The trial court should have entered judgment in favor of

Kurzets as of October 6, 1992, the date the Original Judgment was
entered.
F.

The trial court erred in denying Kurzet's Motion for

Sanctions under Rule 11.

The trial court agreed that Bailey-

Allen's motion to reinstate the Mechanic's Lien cause of action was
without cause.

Yet, it did not enter a finding that Rule 11 had

been violated and it did not impose sanctions.

The courts' reason

for not doing so was that the Rule 11 violation was offset by the
supposedly improper conduct of Kurzets' counsel in bringing the
motion for attorney fees before Judge Iwasaki.

The trial court

erred in failing to enter a finding that Rule 11 had been violated.
The trial court also erred in failing to impose sanctions because
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Rule 11 provides that when a violation has been found, sanctions
are mandatory.
X.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Trial Court's Amended Findings of Fact Are Contrary
to the Court of Appeals7 Mandate to Enter Consistent
Findings.

When a case has been remanded, the trial court must adhere to
"both the letter and the spirit of the [Appellate Court's] mandate,
taking

into

account

the

Appellate

Court's

opinion

and

the

circumstances it embraces." Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P. 2d
1034,

1038

(Utah

1995).

The

Appellate

Court's

mandate

is

inflexible and must be followed even when the trial court believes
there may be a better resolution of the issues.

Id.

In the present case, the Court of Appeals held that the trial
court had not entered findings sufficient to support an award in
quasi-contract.

(R.

812).

In

that

respect,

it

found

two

fundamental deficiencies in the trial court's Original Findings and
Conclusions.

First, the trial court did not specifically address

the three requirements for recovery in unjust enrichment as set out
in Davies v. Olsen,

746 P.2d

264, 268

(Utah App.

811(a)). (See discussion below at Section X.D.)
court's

Original

Findings

were

plagued

1987) . (R.

Second, the trial
with

internal

inconsistencies. (R. 812).
The Court of Appeals

found

it inconsistent

that

although

Bailey-Allen apparently had failed to perform, it had been awarded
$10,000 as the value of the benefit

it conferred on Kurzets.

Likewise, the finding that Bailey-Allen conferred a benefit of
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$10,000 "regardless of whether it performed its duties under the
contract" indicated to the Court of Appeals that the "10% of the
work performed during Bailey-Allen's tenure was not necessarily due
to

its

presence

or

performance."

(R.

812).

Due

to

these

inconsistencies, the Court of Appeals could not determine whether
the facts would support an award in unjust enrichment.
The

mandate

of

the

Court

of

Appeals,

(R.812).

therefore,

was

as

follows:
We therefore reverse the award and remand for
an analysis and findings under the standard
articulated in Davies. The trial court should
make detailed, consistent findings on each of
the three required elements and allow recovery
only if all three are satisfied.
(R. 812) (emphasis added).

The trial court has not been able to

comply with the mandate to enter consistent, detailed findings.
The reasons for this failure are (a) the trial court's decision not
to supersede
already

its Original Findings and Conclusions which were

inconsistent;

and

(2)

its

attempt

to

find

evidence

supporting for an award to Bailey-Allen where none exists.
When Bailey-Allen submitted its proposed Amended Findings and
Conclusions it proposed that they "supersede the original Findings
and Conclusions."
uncomfortable

(R. 1113).

abandoning

The trial court, however, was

the Original

Findings, and

ruled that the Original Findings must stand.

2

ultimately

(R. 113 5 ) . 2

The court stated:
I don't know that these supersede the original findings.
I think that they're there. Nothing takes or does away
with them. I think these are additional or corrected
findings, but I don't think you can say they "supersede"
them ...

270166 1

16

The operative findings of fact on t h i s appeal, t h e r e f o r e , are
the Original Findings and the Amended Findings. 3

The Original

Findings were i n s u f f i c i e n t to support an award because they were
internally

inconsistent.

The Amended Findings

are even more

inadequate because they not only preserve the i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s , but
they d i r e c t l y c o n t r a d i c t the evidence.
The f i r s t
Bailey-Allen
11

finding
is

the

that

is inconsistent

statement

in

the

with the award to

Original

Findings

that

[Bailey-Allen] spent very few hours on the job s i t e and did not

give the c o n s t r u c t i o n project the a t t e n t i o n i t required. . . " (R.
217) . 4

Without abandoning t h a t Finding,

the court adopted the

(R. 1135).
A f t e r h e a r i n g some d i s c u s s i o n , a f t e r r e f e r e n c e t o t h e Court of
Appeals' o p i n i o n , and a f t e r t h e argument of c o u n s e l , t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e c i d e d t o
s u b s t i t u t e t h e word " c l a r i f y " for " s u p e r s e d e " . The c o u r t s t a t e d : "I s t i l l d o n ' t
f e e l comfortable w i t h t h e word ' s u p e r s e d e s . '
I'm going t o l e t i t go w i t h
"'clarified'."
(R. 1137).
3

Because t h e t r i a l c o u r t determined t h a t t h e Amended Findings d i d not
s u p e r s e d e t h e O r i g i n a l F i n d i n g s , i t i s unnecessary for Kurzets t o argue on t h i s
appeal t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t was p r e c l u d e d from abandoning i t s O r i g i n a l F i n d i n g s .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e i s a u t h o r i t y t o support t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e law of t h e
case d o c t r i n e a p p l i e s t o p r e c l u d e r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of f i n d i n g s of f a c t from which
no a p p e a l i s t a k e n . See E n v i r o t e c h Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P. 2d 487 (Ut. App.
1994) (when f i n d i n g s of f a c t a r e not c h a l l e n g e d on a p p e a l , t h e Court of Appeals
assumes t h a t t h e f a c t s a r e supported by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence i n t h e r e c o r d ) ;
Thurston v . Box E l d e r County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037-39 (Utah 1995) ( c i t i n g United
S t a t e s v. R i v e r r a - M a r t i n e z , 931 Fed. 2d 148 (1st C i r . ) , c e r t , denied, 502 U.S.
862, 112 S. Ct. 184, 116 L.Ed. 2d 145 (1991)) ("The e x c e p t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s
under which c o u r t s have reopened i s s u e s p r e v i o u s l y decided a r e narrowly d e f i n e d :
(1) when t h e r e has been an i n t e r v e n i n g change of c o n t r o l l i n g a u t h o r i t y ; (2) when
new evidence has become a v a i l a b l e ; or (3) when t h e c o u r t i s convinced t h a t i t s
p r i o r d e c i s i o n was c l e a r l y erroneous and would work a manifest i n j u s t i c e . " ) ;
Robert E. Lee & Co. v . Commission of P u b l i c Works of t h e C i t y of G r e e n v i l l e , 14 9
S.E. 2d 59, 62 ( S . C 1966) ( t r i a l c o u r t cannot make f a c t u a l f i n d i n g s which a r e
" n e c e s s a r i l y c o n t r a r y t o h i s p r e v i o u s r u l i n g " ) ; Haines P i p e l i n e C o n s t r u c t i o n ,
I n c . v . Montana Power Company, 876 P. 2d 632, 637-38 (Mont. 1994) ( e r r o r for
d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o d i s r e g a r d and contravene on remand f i n d i n g s of f a c t not
r e v e r s e d by t h e Court of A p p e a l s ) .
4

In i t s O r i g i n a l Findings and Conclusions, t h e Court d e t e r m i n e d :
6. The Court concludes t h a t Defendants were j u s t i f i e d i n
t e r m i n a t i n g P l a i n t i f f ' s s e r v i c e s because P l a i n t i f f spent
v e r y few hours on t h e job s i t e and d i d not g i v e t h e
construction project the a t t e n t i o n that i t required
under t h e C o n t r a c t and t h a t P l a i n t i f f knew Mr. Kurzet
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following Amended Findings t h a t

attempt

t o reach the

opposite

conclusion:
14. The Court finds t h a t Mr. Richard Allen of
the P l a i n t i f f v i s i t e d the construction s i t e
p r a c t i c a l l y every day for some period of time,
by h i s own testimony.
15.
The Court finds Mr. Allen was a l s o
a v a i l a b l e on h i s mobile phone when not on s i t e
and made or received d a i l y c a l l s concerning
the job.
16. The Court finds t h a t Mr. Allen a l s o spent
considerable time at h i s home in the evening
making c a l l s , s e t t i n g up appointments, and
contacting other c o n t r a c t o r s in connection
with the job.
17.
The Court finds t h a t during the t h r e e
month period t h a t the Contract was in e f f e c t ,
Plaintiff
performed
general
contractor
services,
including
the
hiring
of
subcontractors,
overseeing
the
work
of
subcontractors, g e t t i n g bids on r e t a i n i n g
w a l l s , windows, cabinets and other items,
meeting with people,
including
building
i n s p e c t o r s , and generally coordinating work on
the job.
(R. 1116-17).

As discussed below, these Amended Findings are not

supported by the evidence.

Even if they were, however, the only

conclusion t h a t can be drawn from them t h a t i s c o n s i s t e n t with the
Original Findings i s t h a t although Mr. Allen v i s i t e d

the

site

would e x p e c t .
(R. 2 1 7 ) . In i t s Amended Findings and Conclusions, t h e t r i a l c o u r t o m i t t e d any
r e f e r e n c e t o Kurzets being j u s t i f i e d i n t e r m i n a t i n g B a i l e y - A l l e n because i t s p e n t
v e r y few hours on t h e j o b s i t e . (R. 1115) . The r e a s o n for t h e omission was t h a t
t h e c o u r t could not r e c a l l f i n d i n g t h a t B a i l e y - A l l e n had f a i l e d t o put i n t h e
hours t h a t were r e q u i r e d t o do t h e j o b .
(R. 1013, 1032-33) .
In K u r z e t s '
O b j e c t i o n s t o t h e Proposed Findings and Conclusions Kurzets p o i n t e d out t h e t r i a l
c o u r t ' s r u l i n g from t h e bench a t t h e c l o s e of t r i a l where t h e c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t
B a i l e y - A l l e n was on t h e 7 j o b "very few hours" (R. 1081, quo t i n g R. 798) .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , when Kurzets o b j e c t i o n came up a t t h e h e a r i n g on o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e
f i n d i n g s , t h e c o u r t o v e r r u l e d t h e o b j e c t i o n and e n t e r e d t h e Amended F i n d i n g . (R.
1144) .
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nearly every day, made and received calls on his mobile phone and
at

home

in

the

evenings,

and

performed

"general

contractor

services," he nevertheless was on the job site very few hours and
did not give the project the attention it required.

The Court on

this appeal, therefore, faces the same internal inconsistencies as
on the

first

appeal.

An award

for unjust

enrichment

is not

warranted under these facts.
The

second persistent

inconsistency

in the

trial

court's

findings stems from Original Finding No. 8 which states:
8.
The Court finds, that about 10% of the
construction project was completed while
plaintiff was general contractor and, based on
that percentage, defendants received a benefit
from plaintiff's pre-termination services in
the amount of $10,000 regardless of whether
plaintiff performed its duties under the
contract.
(R. 216) (emphasis added).
In discussing the inconsistency in the foregoing statement,
the Court of Appeals stated:
The Kurzets argue persuasively that BaileyAllen does not satisfy the first element of
Davies because Bailey-Allen conferred no
benefit upon them. The trial court seemed to
agree, at least in theory, finding that the
10% of the work completed during BaileyAllen's tenure was not necessarily due to its
presence or performance.
(R.

812).

The

trial

court

easily

could

have

corrected

the

inconsistency by directly identifying the benefit that Bailey-Allen
supposedly conferred on Kurzets, assuming the record would support
such a finding.

The trial court, however, entered the following

Amended Finding:
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18.
The Court finds that during the time
Plaintiff was the general contractor of the
project, the residence progressed from a
concrete slab to a point where the roof was
ready to be completed on the multi-story [sic]
residence.
Based upon the testimony of
Defendants' expert witness, the Court finds
that
10%
of
the
construction
project
contemplated by the Contract was completed
during
the
time
Plaintiff
was
general
contractor.
(R. 1117) (emphasis added).

Again, the trial court did not find

that Bailey-Allen was responsible for the 10% completion as it
could not under the facts in evidence.
in

the

Original

Findings,

that

It merely found, as it did

10% of

completed during the three-month period.
not

support

an award

the

construction

was

The Amended Finding does

in favor of Bailey-Allen.

Instead,

it

accurately implies that it was not Bailey-Allen that conferred the
benefit of the 10% completion.
The trial court has not followed the Court of Appeals' mandate
and the inconsistencies remain. Even assuming the Amended Findings
are supported by substantial evidence, which they are not, it
cannot be determined from the Findings whether the award to BaileyAllen was warranted.

The trial court's award to Bailey-Allen,

therefore, should be reversed and the court should be instructed to
enter judgment in favor of Kurzets.
B.

The Trial Court Erred in Entering Findings That Weren't
Supported by the Evidence.
A trial court's factual findings are reviewed under a

clearly erroneous standard.
1994) .

Although

the

State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 939 (Utah

standard

imposes

a

heavy

burden

on

an

appellant, findings must be reversed if they are "against the clear
20
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weight of evidence or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."

Cal

Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah
1995) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)) . In
the present case, even considering all of the evidence in support
of the trial court's Amended Findings, and viewing those findings
in the light most favorable to the court, the Amended Findings
discussed below are so lacking in support that they are against the
clear weight of evidence.

They are, therefore, clearly erroneous.

See Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024,
1028

(Utah 1995)

(findings may be found clearly erroneous when

appellant has marshalled evidence in support of the findings and
yet they are so lacking in support as to be against the clear
weight of evidence).
The Amended Findings are the trial court's attempt to
find ground on which to retreat from its Original Findings that the
plaintiff spent very few hours on the job site, and that 10% of the
project was completed regardless of Bailey-Allen's presence.

The

series of statements in the Amended Finding's about Mr. Allen's
presence on the project, however, and about the tasks he performed
as general contractor, are simply not based on the evidence.
1.

Amended Finding of Fact No. 14 Is Not Supported by
the Evidence.
Amended Finding No. 14 addresses the frequency with

which Mr. Allen visited the construction site.

It states:

14. Court finds that during the three
month period that the Contract was in
effect, Michael Kent, Plaintiff was on
270166 1
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the
construction
site
approximately
thirty (30) hours per week. In addition,
Mr. Richard Allen of the Plaintiff
visited the construction site practically
every day for some period of time, by his
own testimony.
(R. 1116 (emphasis added)). 5
This finding is not supported by any evidence, even by
Mr. Allen's own testimony.

Mr. Allen did not state that he was

personally on the site every day.
the subject.

When asked, he was vague about

(R. 441). His testimony was as follows:

Q.

For yourself, what type of time did you spend on the job
in terms say of day-by-day?

A.

It varied.

Q.

How did it vary?

A.

Some days I spent 10-hours on the job, some days I would
be there an hour or two.

Q.

And this was weekly, right?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Some days you missed?

A.

Yes.

o.

That was because you had what, other jobs going on?

A.

Yes, Mike would have been there.

5

court.

The words "by his own testimony" were added at the insistence of the
The court stated:
My recollection is that that is the testimony that was
given. Now, I probably did not find that Mr. Allen
visited the site every day. I think he indicated -Let's see, Kent is the one that was there; this is
Allen. I think there was a correct statement, which his
testimony was regarding, but I didn't necessarily find
he visited every day, and I would ask that be corrected.

(R. 1138-39) . The "correction" was to add "by his own testimony" to a statement
that was clearly false by anyone's testimony.
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(R. 441) .

There is apparently no other evidence that Mr. Allen

visited the site every day.
To the contrary, Mr. Kurzet testified that Mr. Allen was
"seldom there" (R. 507) or "very seldom" there.

(R. 515).

Mr.

Kurzet stated that he could recall a period of approximately four
or five weeks where he never saw Mr. Allen on the site once.

(Id.)

During the period from July, 1990, to the end of September, 1990,
he said Mr. Allen was "almost never" on the job site.

(R. 656) .

The testimony of Andrew Parker, the framing contractor who
spent 40-50 hours a week on the job (R. 694), was similar:
Q.

. . . as to Mr. Allen, how many hours a day would you
think you say Mr. Allen on the job site?

A.

There was a lot less frequency. I guess he was running
around coordinating other jobs, so if he showed up at
all, it would be, you know, under a half an hour.

(R. 695).
Another

workman

on the

job, Ken Anderson,

agreeing

with

Bailey-Allen's counsel on cross-examination, testified that Mr.
Allen might have averaged one hour per day.

(R. 744) . He did not

testify that Mr. Allen was there every day, he only admitted that
his time might have averaged one hour per day.
There is apparently no other evidence about the number of days
or length of time that Mr. Allen spent on the job site.

The

court's finding that Mr. Allen was there "practically every day" is
simply not supported by the record.

More importantly, it cannot be

said that Mr. Allen spent the time necessary to take credit for the
10%

of

the project

that was

completed.

The

only

reasonable

conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence is that Mr. Allen
270166 1
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was on the job site "very few"

hours," not frequently enough or

long enough to function as general contractor or to give

the

project the attention it required.
2.

Finding of Fact No.
Substantial Evidence.

15

Is

Not

Supported

by

Amended Finding No. 15 states: "[T]he Court finds that Mr.
Allen was also available on his mobile phone when not on-site and
made or received daily calls concerning the job."

(R. 1116).

Kurzets do not dispute that Mr. Allen had a mobile phone.
he did not make or receive daily calls concerning the job.

But
The

evidence in support of the finding consists of Mr. Allen's own
testimony and Mr. Kent's testimony.

Mr. Allen testified on direct

as follows:
Q.

Alright. Did you, in fact, have a mobile phone by which
you could be reached by those who were on-site?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did they call you often?

A.

Yes.

Q.

On an average week, how many calls would you get yourself
from someone on-site asking a question?
Before you
answer that, I'll remind you that, of course, Mr. Kent
was on the site for considerable amount of time. He was,
was he not?

A.

If Mike was on the site, they wouldn't call me.

Q.

How many calls a week, if you know, did you average from
Mr. Parker during that 12-week period?

A.

Probably two.

Q.

Two a week?

A.

Yes.
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(R. 754). Two calls a week is not "daily," and Mr. Allen's level
of communication does not demonstrate any significant involvement
with the project.
finding

is

talking to
phone.

The only other evidence in support of this

Mr. Kent's vague testimony:
[Mr. Kurzet] .

"Richard was always

I never really talked to him on the

Richard spent a lot of phone time."

(R. 490).

There is substantial evidence to contradict the finding.

Mr.

Kurzet stated that sometimes he was able to get in touch with
Bailey-Allen with one phone call, but sometimes he couldn't get
them until the evening.

(R. 515-16) . Bailey-Allen was not easy to

reach on the telephone and, although Mr. Allen had a mobile phone
number, Mr. Kurzet could only reach somebody "about a third of the
time" he tried.

(R. 616-17).

Andrew Parker testified that even though Bailey-Allen had a
mobile phone, it was "very difficult to often communicate [with]
them, but on occasion I would get through . . . "

(R. 731).

Mr.

Parker had a mobile phone on the site and he made attempts to call
Mr.

Allen

when

he

needed

to

ask

him

a

question.

(R.

731) .

Infrequently, Bailey-Allen would come to the site in response to
one of Mr. Parker's phone calls. (R. 739). Generally, Mr. Parker
found it difficult to communicate with Bailey-Allen, and when he
could it was not helpful, either because Bailey-Allen did not have
the answer to his question (R. 732), or because it was the kind of
problem that could not be discussed on the phone.

(R. 73 8) ("It's

pretty hard to explain a blueprint problem over the phone").

There

were occasions when Mr. Parker could have called Mr. Allen but he
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had no confidence that Mr. Allen would have the answer to his
question.

(R. 731-32).

There is apparently no other evidence concerning Mr. Allen's
use of the mobile phone.

The only reasonable conclusion that can

be drawn from the record is that Mr. Allen was not accessible when
he was needed, either in person or by telephone.

The court's

finding that he was available on the mobile phone and received
daily calls concerning the job is not supported by the evidence.
3.

Amended Finding of Fact No. 16 Is Not Supported By
the Evidence.

Amended Finding of Fact No. 16 states as follows:
The Court finds that Mr. Allen also spent
considerable time at his home in the evening
making calls, setting up appointments in
contacting other contractors in connection
with the job.
(R. 1117).
Mr.

Kent

Again, there is no evidence to support this finding.
(not Mr. Allen) offered the following testimony under

examination by Bailey-Allen's counsel:
Q.

Did much of your coordination -- or did any of your
coordination efforts occur at night on the telephone; for
example, as opposed to being on-site?

A.

Oh, yes. Most subcontractors can't be reached during the
day because they're on the job.
You do most of your
coordinating with telephone contacts at nighttime.

Q.

The estimate you gave counsel of 3 5 to 40 hours a week,
was that on-site time?

A.

On-site time.

Q.

In addition to that, you spent other time at home at
night on the telephone coordinating?

A.

Yes.

Q.

In an average day, how much time would that take?
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A.

Probably and hour or two; however, Richard was always
talking to Stan. I never really talked to him on the
phone. Richard spent a lot of time on the phone.

(R. 489-90).
No. 15.

This testimony does not support the court's Finding

It was Mr. Kent, not Mr. Allen, that made evening calls if

any were made.

Time was billable at $22.00 per hour.

Mr. Kent was

not qualified to act as a general contractor. (R. 465).
Allen was the licensed contractor.

Richard

(R. 366). Mr. Kent would not

have been entitled to any of the general contractor's fee even if
Bailey-Allen

had

completed

the

project

because

his

time

was

billable at $22.00 per hour.
In addition, Mr. Kent didn't state that he made any phone
calls, only that "you," meaning most general contractors, make most
of their phone calls at night. (R. 489).

Mr. Kent may have made

some phone calls, but the record does not say who he called, on
what occasions, for what purpose, what appointments if any were set
up or whether any "general contracting" work was accomplished at
all.

There is no evidence for the statement in Amended Finding No.

16 that Mr. Allen spent considerable time in the evenings making
calls.
4.

Amended Finding No. 17 Is Not Supported By the
Evidence.

Amended Finding No. 17 states as follows:
The Court finds that during the three month
period that the Contract was in effect,
Plaintiff
performed
general
contractor
services,
including
the
hiring
of
subcontractors,
overseeing
the
work
of
subcontractors, getting bids on retaining
walls, window, cabinets and other items,
meeting
with
people,
including
building

270166 1

27

inspectors, and generally
work on the job.
(R. 1117).

coordinating

the

This statement generally describes the services that

Bailey-Allen

claimed

it performed

as general

contractor.

It

identifies four categories of tasks: (1) hiring and overseeing the
work of subcontractors; (2) getting bids; (3) meeting with people;
and

(4) generally coordinating the work on the job.

little

doubt

that

Bailey-Allen

"performed

general

There is
contractor

services" of some description during the three months that the
Contract was in effect.

The evidence indicates, however, that

Bailey-Allen did not perform all of the services stated in Amended
Finding No. 17.

When it did, for the most part, Bailey-Allen's

involvement resulted in substandard work.

(R. 3 75-76).

Mr. Allen explained the services that Bailey-Allen provided as
follows:
A.

We arranged with -- along with Stan Kurzet -- to get a
framing subcontractor started.
We arranged for and
supervised excavation and back filling. We talked with
Stan Kurzet and arranged, with his approval, the masonry
subcontractors to start on the fireplaces and masonry.
We had a plumber do some preliminary work. We worked
with the steel erectors, had them complete the erection
of the steel framework.
We arranged
for site
organization, site clean-up, talked with him on getting
an electrical subcontractor and had many discussions
about that.

270166 1

Q.

Did you have anything to do with ordering of materials or
supplies during the time you were on the project?

A.

Yes, when we got there there was a substantial amount of
material on the site that was left there from the
previous builder. We counted that up for him, and gave
him a price we thought would be the worth for that to
settle with the old contractor.
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(R. 339-40).

Mr. Allen offered substantially the same testimony on

rebuttal-direct but also testified that he hired concrete cutters
and cement subcontractors and placed an order for windows.
752) .
but

(R.

He was "in the process of" ordering cabinets and roofing,

apparently

"scheduled

never did.

and

(Id.)

coordinated

with

He also
the

testified

masonry

and

subcontractors" the inspections performed by the city.

that

he

framing
(R. 752-

53) .
a.

Hiring and Overseeing Subcontractors,

Mr. Allen arranged for an excavator, a concrete cutter, a
concrete subcontractor, a plumber, and a steel contractor.

(R.

116) .
Kurzets were pleased with the excavator who performed the
backfill on the project.

(R. 428, 601).

The record does not

indicate the cost of the work or its value to the project.

The

record also is silent on the concrete cutter's work except for Mr.
Allen's testimony that there was "a lot of concrete cutting." (R.
426-27).
Mr. Allen hired a plumber once during the three-month period.
(R. 423-25, 652, 711). The plumber installed a toilet, a sink and
a hose-bib, and he cut off several floor drains in the basement
where they protruded above the cement slab.

(R. 425, 652).

He

worked for one day and a half, and the bill for his services was
about $1,200.

There were no complaints about the work, but it was

insignificant to the Project.

(R. 652, 711) .
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Bailey-Allen also hired a steel subcontractor to install some
beams.

(R. 427) . The only testimony about the steel work was from

the framing subcontractor who observed that the steel beams were
incorrectly placed and that they had to be removed and re-welded.
(R. 696).
The

only

subcontractor

hired

by

Bailey-Allen

to

perform

significant work on the project was the concrete subcontractor.
Bailey-Allen supervised its work in pouring trenches, a retaining
wall and

stairs.

(R. 426-27) .

Mr. Allen admitted

that

the

retaining wall was out of square and the concrete was too wet and
blew out the forms.

(R. 435-39) . Damages in favor of Kurzet's to

repair the retaining wall are included in the court's Original
Judgment

and

its

Although

Mr. Allen

Amended

Judgment

apparently

did

(R.
not

218-19,

1121,

acknowledge

testimony, the stairs were also defective.

it

in

his

(R. 487-8, 712-14) .

Kurzet's were awarded damages for having to repair them.
1126).

1126) .

(R. 219,

In short, the concrete subcontractor that Bailey-Allen

hired performed substandard work and Bailey-Allen's oversight of
that work was inadequate.
Mr. Allen talked to an electrician about doing some electrical
work, but the electrician was not available.

(R. 424) . He thought

Mr. Kurzet ultimately hired the electrician, although he didn't
know for sure.

(R. 119) . Mr. Allen did not recall any electrical

work being done while he was on the job.

(R. 119, 711).

Bailey-Allen did not hire some of the subcontractors that it
claimed to have hired.
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The framing subcontractor was hired by Mr.
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Kurzet and began working several days before Bailey-Allen began
working on the job.

(R. 511-12).

Although Mr. Kurzet ostensibly

gave Bailey-Allen the choice to retain the framing subcontractor,
the "choice" was a test to see whether Bailey-Allen would make a
sound decision and hire Andrew Parker as the framing subcontractor.
(R. 648, 431) .

Kurzets also hired the mason.

(R. 428-29) .

The trial court's Amended Finding No. 17 is misleading to the
extent it implies that Bailey-Allen hired the subcontractors who
completed 10% of the Project.

At best, Kurzets avoided a loss on

the work of the cement contractor and realized little benefit from
the others.

The subcontractors who significantly advanced the

construction during Bailey-Allen's tenure were not hired by BaileyAllen.
b.

Meeting

With

People,

Including

Building

Inspectors.
In addition to hiring subcontractors, Finding No. 17 states
that Mr. Allen "met with people" and "generally coordinated" the
work on the job.

Mr. Allen testified that he arranged for city

inspectors to conduct perhaps a dozen on-site inspections. (R. 75253) .

He also met

"occasionally" with the architect

and

less

frequently with the engineer. (R. 430-31) . The architect testified
that he met with Mr. Allen only three or four times over the three
month period and met with Mr. Kent even less frequently.
72).

(R. 671-

Later, he qualified his answer and stated that he would say

"maybe more than four, but surely less than ten" occasions
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(R.

676) .6 The record does not demonstrate Mr. Allen "met with people11
frequently or even regularly, or that his meetings contributed
significantly to advancing the work.

c.

Getting Bids,

Mr. Allen ordered some m a t e r i a l s for the p r o j e c t and arranged
for a crane t o be on the s i t e .

(R. 432-34).

for windows and one order for lumber.

He placed an order

(R. 443) .

Kurzets were

awarded damages for B a i l e y - A l l e n ' s mistake in ordering the lumber.
(R. 652, 714-30, 1126) . Bailey-Allen offered t o obtain competitive
bids for the mason, but Mr. Kurzet had already hired the mason. (R.
428-29) . Mr. Allen suggested, without a c t u a l l y s t a t i n g i t , t h a t he
may have obtained bids on cabinets and roofing, but orders were
never placed for those m a t e r i a l s .
d.

(R. 752).

Generally Coordinating the Work on the Job.

Mr. A l l e n ' s own testimony contains with references about how
he "coordinated the work on the j o b . " ( e . g . , R. 752-53).

For the

most p a r t , however, h i s testimony i s s e l f - s e r v i n g and i n a c c u r a t e .
As discussed above, the evidence shows t h a t Mr. Allen was not
involved

and not e f f e c t i v e at coordinating the work.

As the t r i a l

court observed from the bench at the end of t r i a l , Bailey-Allen was
not on the s i t e and was not g e t t i n g the job done. (R. 801).
Mr. Allen was very infrequently on s i t e as the p r o j e c t was
evolving.

He could not keep abreast of i t , or take i n i t i a t i v e in

6

Andrew P a r k e r , on t h e o t h e r hand, met with t h e a r c h i t e c t " p r e t t y much
every a f t e r n o o n a f t e r work."
(R. 700). The meetings i n v o l v e d Mr. Kurzet b u t ,
t o Mr. P a r k e r ' s r e c o l l e c t i o n n e i t h e r Richard A l l e n nor Michael Kent ever met w i t h
t h e framer a t t h e a r c h i t e c t ' s o f f i c e .
(R. 7 0 0 - 0 1 ) . This c o r r e s p o n d s w i t h Mr.
A l l e n ' s t e s t i m o n y who never r e c a l l s meeting w i t h t h e a r c h i t e c t on framing r e l a t e d
questions.
(R. 4 3 4 ) .
270166 1

32

performing his duties. The only thing he could do was exactly what
Mr. Kurzet told him to do. (R. 753).

Even then, Mr. Kurzet felt

that Bailey-Allen was seldom responsive to his directives and not
on the job site long enough to adequately do his job.

(R. 507,

513-15, 616, 656, 695, 738, 744) .

The framer, contrary to Mr.

Allen's

Allen

testimony,

testified

that

was

not

involved

in

resolving framing problems. (R. 657, 704).
The record reveals that at times Bailey-Allen was neglectful
of its duties, if not incompetent.

For example, in looking after

the architectural plans, which was a responsibility of the general
contractor (R. 4 91), it appears that Mr. Allen lost them.

During

an inspection, when Mr. Kent went to obtain the plans (which were
supposed to remain on-site), he found they were missing. (R. 491,
518) .
The trial court's Amended Finding No. 17 is not supported by
the evidence.

It was Mr. Kurzet, Mr. Parker, and others who were

on-site, not Bailey-Allen, were "generally coordinating" the work.
Although there can be little doubt that Mr. Allen performed some
services of a general contractor, they are insufficient as a matter
of law to support the trial court's award of $10,000 to BaileyAllen.

The trial court's Initial Finding from the bench at the

close of trial more accurately reflects the record:
Of course
[Mr. Kurzet] said there were
philosophical difference (sic), and I think
there were differences that began to arise as
far as the attitude of being on the job,
taking care of things right now, getting
things done, seeing that they were done,
seeing things were moving along, answering the
questions, which the plaintiffs were not
270166 1
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performing
concerned.

as

far

as

the

contract

was

Therefore the Court does find that the
plaintiff did breach the contract, and that
the defendant was justified in terminating the
relationship, terminating the Contract.
(R. 801).
5.

Finding of Fact No, 19 Is Not Supported By the
Evidence,

Amended Finding of Fact No. 19 states:
The Court finds that Defendant Stanley Kurzet
was regularly on the job site, often as much
as six (6) hours a day.
He personally
observed the progress on the home.
As a
result, Defendants were aware of the progress
of the home while Plaintiff was the general
contractor and was aware of the benefit
Defendants received as a result of Plaintiff's
services.
(R. 1117) (emphasis added).

Kurzets do not dispute this finding

except the last clause that states they were aware of a benefit
received

from

incorrectly,

Bailey-Allen's

services.

The

finding

implies,

that because Mr. Kurzet was on the job site, he

appreciated some benefit from Bailey-Allen's efforts.
During

the

three

months

of

Bailey-Allen's

tenure,

the

structure progressed from a foundation slab and steel columns at
the beginning of July to a structure with masonry chimneys and
three floors framed by the first week in October.
676-77) .

(R. 646-47,

It is true that because Mr. Kurzet was frequently on

site, he would be likely to know whether Bailey-Allen contributed
toward that progress. Mr. Kurzet's testimony was that Bailey-Allen
was not there and the benefit was entirely conferred by others.
(R.618-19).
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Mr. Allen admitted that the main focus of the construction
during that three-month period was the masonry and the framing.
(R. 756) . Mr. Kurzet attributes the progress made during that time
entirely to the framer, Andrew Parker, who acted as the general
contractor.

(R. 513, 618-19).

Although Mr. Parker tried to keep

Allen abreast of the progress, he was not there to contribute on a
day-to-day basis.

(Id.)

Bailey-Allen was not on the job site long

enough to perform the services it had been hired to perform. (R.
616) .
To

the

extent

Amended

Finding

No.

19

suggests

that

the

progress on the home was due to Bailey-Allen's efforts, it is
inconsistent with the trial court's ruling at the close of trial
and the Original Findings, and contrary to the evidence.
6.

Finding of Fact No, 20 Is Not Supported by the
Evidence,

Finding of Fact No. 20 states as follows:
The Court finds that at no time during the
three-month period in which the Contract was
in
effect
did
Defendant's
express
any
dissatisfaction with the work or progress on
the job.
On at least one occasion Stanley
Kurzet expressed to Plaintiff that he was
satisfied with the way the work was going.
Defendants did not attempt to stop Plaintiff
from completing the Contract until Defendant,
Stanley
Kurzet, terminated
the
same
in
connection with the insurance matter.
(R. 1117-18) (emphasis added).
It is not true as the court found that "at no time during the
three-month period . . . did Defendants express any dissatisfaction
with the work or progress on the job."
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(R. 1117).

Mr. Allen

admitted that Mr. Kurzet occasionally expressed dissatisfaction.
(R. 348). Mr. Kent, likewise, testified as follows:
Q.

Did Mr. Kurzet ever express satisfaction generally with
the way things were being handled prior to October 2nd?

A.

Not generally.

Q.

Did he ever express concerns about an item or two that
maybe wasn't going the way he wanted it to?

A.

Oh, yes.

Q.

Did Mr. Kurzet have a manner by which you could tell
which things were important to him or not?

A.

Yes, he would tell you verbally, and if he were more
concerned, he would give it in writing.

(R. 466-67) .

Mr. Kurzet also testified that he expressed his

dissatisfaction

through

entries

in

his

log

distributed to Bailey-Allen, and verbally.
court's

Finding

that Mr. Kurzet

book

that

were

(R. 510-11) .

The

never express

dissatisfaction

simply does not square with the record.
7.

Summary.

In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support
the trial court's Amended Findings, the evidence must be viewed in
light most favorable to Bailey-Allen.

Consolidation Coal Company

v. Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, 886 P.2d 514 (Utah
1994); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah
1989).
the

Nevertheless, there is absolutely no evidence to support

findings

that

(1)

"Allen

of

the

Plaintiff

visited

the

construction site practically every day for some period of time";
(2) Mr. Allen "made and received daily calls concerning the job,"
either from his home or on his mobile phone; and (3) that Kurzets
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did not express dissatisfaction with the work during the three
month period.

Even viewing Kent and Allen's testimony in the most

favorable light, the findings that (1) Kurzets realized a $10,000
benefit from Bailey-Allen's general contracting services during
that

three

month period;

and

(2) that

Bailey-Allen

performed

significant general contracting services, are against the clear
weight of evidence.
The foregoing Amended Findings of Fact, therefore, should be
set aside as clearly erroneous and the Amended Judgment reversed.
C.

The Trial Court's Amended Findings of Fact
and
Conclusions of Law Do Not Satisfy the Elements Necessary
for Recovery in Quasi-Contract.

The

Court

of

Appeals

carefully

discussed

the

elements

necessary for recovery on a claim for unjust enrichment.
811 (a)-812).

(R.

The Court stated:

To prove a contract implied in law or unjust
enrichment, the following must be shown: " (1)
The defendant received a benefit; (2) an
appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of
the benefit; (3) under circumstances that
would make it unjust for the defendant to
retain the benefit without paying for it."
(R. 812) (quoting Davies v. Olsen, 746 P.2d at 269).
On the first appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the first
element under Davies had not been satisfied because the conclusion
was internally inconsistent that Bailey-Allen conferred a benefit
"regardless of whether Plaintiff performed its duties under the
Contract."

(R. 812).

The Court of Appeals held that the trial

court must find that the 10% of the work completed during BaileyAllen's contract was due to Bailey-Allen's performance on the job.
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In its Amended Conclusions of Law, the Court stated:

"The

Court concludes that Plaintiff's services as general contractor
conferred a benefit to the Defendants."
turned around the statement

that

(R. 1119) . The court also

10% of the Project

had

been

completed during the time plaintiff was general contractor and
stated:
The Court concludes that the proper and
appropriate measure of the benefit conferred
upon Defendants is the pro-rata portion of the
fee previously agreed in the Contract. Based
upon the testimony of Defendants' expert
witness,
one-tenth
of
construction
contemplated by the Contract was completed and
as a result, plaintiff conferred a benefit
upon defendants in the amount of $10,000.
(R. 1120) (emphasis added).
Amended

Findings do not

benefit.

As discussed above, the trial court's

state that Bailey-Allen

conferred

any

Assuming it did, there is not substantial evidence to

support that proposition.

(R. 1120) .

The first element of the

Davies test has not and cannot be met.
Likewise, the second element of the Davies test has not been
satisfied.

The Amended Conclusions state:
The Court concludes that the Defendants were
aware of the benefit conferred as a result of
Plaintiff's
general
contractor
services
through its actual on-site observation and
satisfaction of the work performed.

(R. 1120) .

As discussed above, Kurzets do not acknowledge any

benefit received from Bailey-Allen.

They contend, and the evidence

demonstrates that during the three-month period of the Contract,
the progress toward completion was accomplished by the framer and
the mason, not by Bailey-Allen or its subcontractors.
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The court's

conclusion that Kurzets were aware of the benefit, is simply not
warranted by the facts.

(R. 1119-20).

Moreover, the Amended

Finding that Kurzets did not express any satisfaction with BaileyAllen's performance is simply contrary to the evidence.
The trial court's Amended Conclusions of Law state explicitly
the third element of the Davies test: " [I]t would be unjust for the
Defendants to retain the benefit received without paying for the
same."

(R. 1120).

The conclusion is not supportable, however, in

view of the absence of evidence in the record to support

the

Amended Findings of Fact and the absence of any explanation for the
trial court's reversal of its Original Findings. For the foregoing
reasons, Bailey-Allen has not satisfied the elements for recovery
in quasi-contract.
D.

The Trial Court Erred in Determining that Kurzets Had
Been Unjustly Enriched by Bailey-Allen's Renegotiating
the Price Lumber and Erred in Determining the Amount by
which thev were Supposedly Enriched.

The Court of Appeals instructed the trial court to determine
whether an award in quasi-contract was warranted for Bailey-Allen
having saved Kurzets $5,500 on the purchase of lumber that had been
ordered by a previous contractor.

(R. 812(a)).

The Court of

Appeals stated:
We note that the court should make certain
that any benefit conferred in negotiating the
price of the lumber must be somehow in
addition
to
the
benefits
Bailey-Allen
conferred
by
virtue
of
performing
its
contractual duty to supervise the project.
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(Id.)

(emphasis added).

Bailey-Allen had a contractual duty to

obtain competitive, economic bids for materials.

(R.010).

The

Contract provides as follows:
The Contractor will obtain competitive bids
for services and materials . . . Every effort
will be made by the Contractor to locate,
solicit and select suppliers sufficiently in
advance of need to prevent
the
forced
acceptance of and uneconomic bid.
All bids
will provide sufficient detail to permit an
intelligent analysis of the value of such bid.
(R. 0010).

On remand, the trial court, without citing any evidence

or hearing any argument on the meaning of this provision, entered
Amended Conclusion of Law No. 17 which states simply: "Negotiation
of the disputed lumber bill left over from prior contractor was not
within the scope of the Contract."

(R. 1121).

The court made no

attempt to ascertain the intention of the parties or to interpret
the relevant provision of the Contract that might have guided its
decision.
Bailey-Allen was required to obtain bids and see that Kurzet's
paid a fair price for services and material.

Bailey-Allen did not

obtain the initial bid on the lumber because it had not yet been
hired as general contractor.

But it inventoried the lumber and

compared the invoiced price against its estimation of the value.
In terms of its duty to obtain competitive bids for materials,
there seems to be little difference between obtaining a reasonable
price when ordering materials and obtaining a reasonable price for
materials delivered but not yet paid for.

Moreover, Mr. Allen's

own testimony suggests that he considered counting up lumber as
part of his general contractor duties since he included that task
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in his description of services that he supposedly provided as a
general contractor.

(R. 339-40) .

In the absence of any other

evidence of record or analysis by the trial court as to the meaning
of the Contract, there is no basis for its conclusion that such
duties fall outside the Contract.
Assuming

for

the

sake

of

argument

that

counting

and

negotiating the price of lumber were not within the scope of the
Contract, the trial court's Amended Judgment on this issue still
should be reversed because its calculation of damages is without
any basis in the facts or the law.
Damages for unjust enrichment are recoverable when it can be
shown that defendant received a benefit, that defendant had a
knowledge or appreciation of the benefit, when it would be unjust
for defendant to retain the benefit without paying for it.
812); Davies v. Olsen, 646 P.2d at 269.

(R.

The measure of damages is

"[tlhe benefit conferred on the defendant, and not the plaintiff's
detriment or the reasonable value of its services."
(citing Davies 646 P. 2d at 269) (emphasis in original) .
The relevant Amended Conclusion of Law states:
The Court concludes that with respect to the
inventorying and negotiation of a settlement
on the disputed prior lumber bill, Plaintiff
conferred a benefit on the Defendants in the
amount of $5,500, which benefit is in addition
to the benefit conferred by Plaintiff's
completion of 10% of the construction.
The
Court concludes that Defendants were aware of
Plaintiff's actions with respect thereto and
that it would be unjust to allow Defendants to
retain such benefit without payment of a
reasonable fee to Plaintiff for such benefit.
Accordingly, the Court finds that a fee of 1-2
the savings on the lumber bill or $2,750, is
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(R. 812)

fair and reasonable under the circumstances.
The Court finds this result particularly fair
and reasonable inasmuch as the Court has
deducted from Plaintiff's recovery the cost of
extra materials Plaintiff ordered for the job
which were ultimately found to be unnecessary.
(R. 1121-22).7

The court's disposition of the issue ignores the

Court of Appeals instruction that any damages awarded in unjust
enrichment must be predicated on the value of the benefit rendered.
The court somehow concluded that because Bailey-Allen saved Kurzets
$5,500 on the negotiation of lumber, that Bailey-Allen should be
entitled to half of the savings. That calculation is a compromise
of the court's Original Judgment awarding Bailey-Allen the entire
amount.

(Clearly, if Bailey-Allen were awarded the entire $5,500,

Kurzets would have realized no benefit at all.) The court decided,
therefore, to split

the savings

in half.

The award

is an

absolutely arbitrary determination of the value of the benefit
conferred.
Because t h e r e
conclude
because

that
the

i s no b a s i s

counting
court

has

lumber

in the record for
fell

arbitrarily

outside
arrived

the
at

the court
Contract,

the

measure

to
and
of

damages, the award t o Bailey-Allen of $2,750 for n e g o t i a t i n g the
p r i c e of lumber should be reversed.

7

The t r i a l c o u r t a p p a r e n t l y misunderstood t h e Court of A p p e a l s '
i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t i n o r d e r t o support an award, i t must f i n d " t h a t any b e n e f i t
c o n f e r r e d i n n e g o t i a t i n g t h e p r i c e of lumber must be somehow i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e
b e n e f i t s B a i l e y - A l l e n c o n f e r r e d by v i r t u e of performing i t s c o n t r a c t u a l d u t y t o
s u p e r v i s e t h e p r o j e c t " . (R. 8 1 2 ( a ) ) . I n s t e a d , t h e c o u r t found t h a t such d u t i e s
were i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e 10% b e n e f i t supposedly c o n f e r r e d . (R. 1121-22) .
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E.

The Trial Court Erred in Denying Kurzet's Motion for
Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc.
A judgment

is final until it is reversed on appeal,

modified or set aside by the court that rendered it.
Aston, 844 P. 2d 345, 351 (Utah App. 1992) .

D'Aston v.

When an opportunity

exists to challenge a decision at one stage of the litigation, and
the decision remains unchallenged, it becomes "the law of the case
for future stages of the same litigation and the parties are deemed
to have waived the right to challenge that decision at a later
time."

Williamsburg Wax Museum Inc. v. Historic Figures, Inc., 810

F.2d 243, 250

(D.C. Cir. 1987) .

If a judgment is reversed on

appeal, the reversal invalidates only the portion of the judgment
to which the appellate court's decision extends "in actuality or by
necessary implication."

D'Aston v. Aston, 844 P. 2d at 351-52.

Other portions of the judgment remain in effect.

"Any portion of

the judgment not appealed from continues in effect, regardless of
the reversal of other parts of the judgment."

Id. at 352 (quoting

Calistro v. Spokane Valley Irr. Dist. No. 10, 78 Wash.2d 234, 472
P.2d 539, 540 (1970)); see also, IB Moore's Federal Practice, §
0.404. [4. (3)] (1993) ("If an appeal is taken from only part of the
judgment, the remaining part is res judicata, and the vacation of
the

portion

appealed

from

does

not

revive

the

trial

court's

jurisdiction of the unappealed portion of the judgment).
On October 6, 1992, the Court entered the Original Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law concluding that Bailey-Allen was liable
to Kurzets in the amount of $4,359 for faulty construction and for
over-ordering
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materials.

(R. 218-19).
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Judgment

was

entered

applying those amounts as offsets against the $15,500 award to
Bailey-Allen for unjust enrichment leaving a net judgment in favor
of Bailey-Allen of $11,141.

(R. 220-22).

Bailey-Allen did not challenge the portion of the Original
Judgment in favor of Kurzets, either at the trial court, or on the
first appeal.

It did not move for reconsideration or to set aside

the judgment, nor did it cross appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Bailey-Allen never questioned the portion of the Original Judgment
in favor of Kurzets until August of 1995 when, after
Kurzets moved for entry of judgment nunc pro tunc.

remand,

(R. 0969-978).

Likewise, the Court of Appeals' mandate did not affect the
portion of the judgment in favor of Kurzets.

The Court was very

specific in identifying the issues that were remanded to the trial
court for further consideration.

It stated:

Bailey-Allen was not entitled to recover damages under
the Contract. However, it may be entitled to recover in
quantum meruit. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for
entry findings consistent with this opinion and, if those
findings support an award in quantum meruit, for an entry
of a judgment.
We reverse the award of pre-judgment
interest, and we direct the trial court to award postjudgment interest, if a judgment is awarded, only from
the date the new judgment on remand is entered. Finally,
we reverse and remand for entry of attorney fees under
the Mechanic's Lien Statute and for consideration of
whether they should be awarded under the Bond Statutes.
(R. 814(a)).

The trial court was authorized to amend the Original

Judgment only to the extent the Court of Appeals directed.

It was

not authorized to address the portion of the Original Judgment
awarding offsets to Kurzets.

The award to Kurzets, therefore,

remains final and effective as of October 6, 1992, the date the
Original Judgment was entered.
270166 1

Post-judgment interest should run
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on the award from and after October 6, 1992.

Mason v. Western

Mortgage, 754 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1988).8
This Court should direct that the trial court enter judgment
in favor of Kurzets in the amount of $4,359.00 as of October 6,
1992 with interest accruing at the legal rate from and after that
date.

F.

The T r i a l Court Erred in F a i l i n g to Award Sanctions for
B a i l e y - A l l e n ' s Violation of Rule 11.

Rule 11 provides t h a t when an a t t o r n e y signs a pleading,
". . . t o the best of h i s knowledge,
information,
and
belief
formed
after
reasonable inquiry i t i s well grounded in fact
and i s warranted by e x i s t i n g law or a good
faith
argument
for
the
extension,
modification,
or
reversal
of
existing
law. . .
(Utah R. Civ. P. 11) (1995) .

"Reasonable inquiry" does not r e q u i r e

the a t t o r n e y signing the pleading to reach the r i g h t
regarding the s t a t e of the law.

conclusion

I t does, however, require t h a t ,

a f t e r reasonable inquiry, the conclusion be at l e a s t " p l a u s i b l e . "
Barnard v. Utah S t a t e Bar,

857 P.2d 917 (Utah 1993) .

Bailey-

8

In a d d r e s s i n g post-judgment i n t e r e s t on t h e f i r s t a p p e a l , t h e Court
of Appeals s t a t e d :
Mason d i c t a t e s t h a t any post-judgment i n t e r e s t awarded i n t h i s c a s e
should run o n l y from t h e d a t e of t h e new judgment on remand, ^d. a t
987. We t h e r e f o r e r e v e r s e t h e award of post-judgment i n t e r e s t from
A p r i l 17, 1992 and remand for t h e e n t r y of post-judgment i n t e r e s t ,
i f damages a r e awarded, only from t h e d a t e t h e new judgment i s
entered.
(R. 8 1 3 ( a ) ) .
The foregoing s t a t e m e n t of t h e Court of Appeals c o n t e m p l a t e s
i n t e r e s t on a judgment on remand i f one i s e n t e r e d i n favor of B a i l e y - A l l e n . The
p o r t i o n of t h e O r i g i n a l Judgment i n favor of Kurzets was never b e f o r e t h e Court
of A p p e a l s . The Court of Appeals' s t a t e m e n t , t h e r e f o r e , should not be t a k e n t o
mean t h a t i n t e r e s t on t h e o r i g i n a l award t o Kurzets b e g i n s t o run only i f and
when a new judgment i n favor of B a i l e y - A l l e n i s e n t e r e d on remand. Utah law i s
c l e a r t h a t i n t e r e s t runs from t h e d a t e t h a t judgment i s e n t e r e d .
(Utah R. App.
P . 3 2 ; Mason, 754 P.2d a t 987).
270166 1
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Allen's motion to set aside the dismissal of the mechanic's lien
cause of action was not even plausible. Minimal inquiry would have
revealed

that

the

trial

court

could

not

revisit

dismissing the mechanic's lien cause of action.

the

order

See Arnica Mutual

Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 678 P.2d 950, 969-70 (Utah App. 1989)
(after denial of first motion to set aside, remedy

is direct

appeal); Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah
1995) ("law of the case" precludes relitigating issues previously
decided in the same case).
When this case was in the trial court for the first time, on
or about May 20, 1991, Kurzets filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on the second, and fourth causes of action brought under
the mechanic's lien statute and the construction bond statute (R.
062) . The court granted those motions and dismissed the second and
fourth cause of action. (R. 106) ,9 Bailey-Allen filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order Dismissing the Mechanic's Lien Claim
(R. 162), which the court denied on April 12, 1992 (R. 182).
October

6,

1992, the

court

adopted

the

Findings

of

Fact

On
and

Conclusions of Law and entered the Original Judgment. (R. 214-222).
On August 24, 1995, more than one year after the first appeal
had

been

decided,

Bailey-Allen,

along

with

its Memorandum

in

Opposition to Kurzets' Motion for Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc,
filed

a

Motion

Dismissing

to

Set

Aside

the Mechanic's

the

Lien

Trial

Cause

Court's

of Action.

Prior
(R.

Order

962-63).

9
At the same time, the court also dismissed the third cause of action for
unjust enrichment, which it later reinstated during trial.
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Bailey-Allen argued that the court's dismissal was error in the
first instance and that the trial court should reverse that action
and vacate Judge Iwasaki's award of attorney fees to Kurzets. (R.
969, 973-76) .
Kurzets responded to the Motion with a memorandum pointing out
that because Bailey-Allen failed to take the issue on appeal, it
had become res judicata.

(R. 981, 992-94) .

At the same time,

Kurzets, believing Bailey-Allen's motion to be clearly unwarranted,
filed a Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11. (R. 997) . Bailey-Allen
withdrew the motion, but not before defendants had briefed it and
filed its motion for sanctions. (R. 1008).
Hearing on the Motion for Sanctions took place on November 21,
1995.

From the bench the court stated:
. . .the defendant asked for sanctions. Well,
this gets extremely difficult. I don't think
that the plaintiff's motion - I agree with the
defendant that the plaintiff's motion, when
they did not appeal, that he had any cause to
bring the motion back before the court, and
that should have been appealed.
There's no
doubt in the court's mind on that.

(R. 1060).

Although the language is imprecise, the court's meaning

is clear; the Motion to Reinstate the Mechanic's Lien Cause of
Action was without any basis in the law or reasonable extension
thereof.

The trial court correctly decided from the bench that the

motion to set aside was filed in violation of Rule 11.
have entered a finding in that regard.

It should

The court, however, thought

that Kurzets' counsel acted improperly in bringing the motion for
Attorney

Fees

before

Judge

Iwasaki.

(R.

1061).

The

court,

therefore, instead of entering a finding that Rule 11 had been
270166 1
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violated and imposing appropriate sanctions, reached the following
conclusion:
But in a case of this type, and maybe to save
attorney's fees, the attorney's would off-set
each other on that. You could say - I guess
what I'm saying is that this case has gone on
too much as far as too much it seems like in
personalities. I'm going to deny the motion
for sanctions.
I just don't think that
they're necessary as far as the case is
concerned. Any questions?
(R. 1061) . (A copy of the transcript of the court's ruling from the
bench is attached hereto as Addendum H ) .
The court erred in refusing to enter a finding that there had
been a violation of Rule 11, and in "offsetting" that violation
against

the perceived

improper conduct of Kurzets' counsel

in

bringing the motion for attorney fees before Judge Iwasaki.
The court also erred in failing to award attorney fees upon
finding a violation of Rule 11.

Rule 11 provides:

If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed
in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, and appropriate
sanction. . . (Utah R. Civ. P.11)
The rule gives the trial court substantial latitude to tailor the
sanctions to fit the particular facts of each case.
Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Taylor v.
It does not

give the trial court discretion to decline to impose sanctions.
This Court should direct the trial court to enter specific
findings in conformity with its statements from the bench, and to
impose appropriate sanctions under Rule 11.

270166 1
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XI, CONCLUSION
The trial court failed to follow the mandate of the Court of
Appeals to enter consistent, detailed findings on the elements of
Bailey-Allen's

claim

against

Kurzets

for

unjust

enrichment.

Consequently, the inconsistencies that led the Court of Appeals to
reverse the Original Judgment have not been resolved.
the Amended

Findings

identified above, upon which the Amended

Judgment rests, are clearly erroneous.
substantial

In addition,

and credible

evidence

They are not supported by

in the record

instances, are directly contrary to the evidence.

and,

in

some

As demonstrated

in this Brief, the trial court's Amended Judgment manifests a clear
abuse of discretion.
In a case such as this one, where the trial court has failed
to correct its errors on remand, the appellate court may take
corrective

action

in the interests of justice.

The Court of

Appeals has stated:
We are troubled by the incomplete resolution
of the issues raised in our remand order.
Parties to a. . . proceeding are rarely wellserved by repeated examination of the same
issues. . . .
To permit the dispute to
continue is an injustice to the parties.
Willev v. Willev, 914 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Utah App. 1996).

Kurzets

respectfully submit that it would be appropriate for this Court to
direct the trial court to enter Kurzets' proposed Amended Findings
and Conclusions and proposed Amended Judgment.
Kurzets further request that this Court reverse the trial
court's denial of Kurzets' motion for entry of judgment nunc pro
tunc and direct the trial court to enter judgment as of that date
270166 1

49

and

to award Kurzets

interest

from and after that

date.

As

discussed above, that judgment has remained undisturbed since the
day it was entered on October 6, 1992.
Finally, Kurzets respectfully request that this Court direct
the trial court to enter the finding it made from the bench that
Rule 11 was violated when Bailey-Allen filed their motion to set
aside the dismissal of the mechanic's lien cause of action.

There

is no support anywhere in the law for the court's theory that a
Rule 11 violation can be offset against some other perceived bad
conduct.

If nominal fees are appropriate, as the trial court

suggested, they must be awarded.
For

the

foregoing

reasons, this

Court

should

vacate

the

Amended Findings and Conclusions, reverse the Amended Judgment, and
remand the case to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of
Kurzets.
DATED this 26th day of November/ 1996.

Spencex E.yAustin
Willi^miJ< Evans
PARSOTTSTBEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)

ss,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
WILLIAM J. EVANS, being duly sworn says that he is employed in
the

law offices

of PARSONS

BEHLE

& LATIMER,

attorneys for

Appellants, that he has this day served two copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANT and a copy of this Affidavit of Service by handdelivery, to the following:
Bruce J. Nelson
ALLEN NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
DATED this 26th day of November, 129

WILE1AM J.

EVANS

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this

day of November,

1996.

tot

My Commission Expires:

Notary
ry Public^,-, f , J t
Resi ding at ^
V^CC ^yJC>

NOIARY PUBLIC

JANEEN BATT
?01 So Main St , Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
My Comrmssion Expires
March 29 1998

ST\TF OF UTAH
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XII. ADDENDA

A.

Original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

B.

Original Judgment

C.

Opinion of Court of Appeals

D.

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

E.

Amended Judgment

F.

Defendants' Proposed Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

G.

Defendants' Proposed Amended Judgment

H.

Transcript of Ruling on Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions

I.

Rule 11

ADDENDUM A

,,u ;

i iLES"

SPENCER E. AUSTIN (0150)
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276)
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

OCT

7 1992

Clerk of Summit County
BY...

(toputy Cleric

d^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

STANLEY M. KURZET, an
individual; STANLEY M. KURZET
and ANNE L. KURZET, as Trustees
for THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST;
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; and
John Does 1 through 10,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 10870

)

* * * * * * * *

This action, having been tried to the Court, and the
Court, having considered the evidence and the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, hereby makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that the parties intended to and

did enter into a written contract wherein plaintiff agreed to act

000214

as the general contractor and to oversee the construction of
defendants1 residence in Park City, Utah.
2.
ties provided

The Court finds that the contract between the parthat

plaintiff

would

complete

construction

on

defendants1 residence within one year and, in return, defendant
would pay plaintiff $100,000 consideration for plaintiff's services in directing and supervising the construction, and $22.00
per hour for plaintiff's own hands-on labor.
3.

The Court

finds that plaintiff was aware that

defendants had experienced problems with prior general contractors and had terminated two general contractors for unsatisfactory performance.

Plaintiff was also aware that Mr. Kurzet was a

meticulous and demanding individual and would require exacting
performance of the contract.
4.

The Court finds the parties intended and the con-

tract provided for plaintiff, within 10 days after entering into
the contract, to provide defendants with evidence of adequate
liability insurance covering its work pursuant to the contract.
5.

The

Court

finds

that plaintiff

represented

to

defendants that plaintiff had $1 million in liability insurance
coverage in force at the time the parties entered into the contract on July 3, 1990, that defendants wanted $4-5 million in
coverage, and that plaintiff later discovered its policy was only

-2/". ^ A n ^ fT

for $300,000 coverage and that it had been cancelled on October
24, 1989.

6.

The Court finds that, in a memorandum of July 20,

1990 from defendants to plaintiff, which was delivered to Michael
Kent, defendants notified plaintiff that plaintiff had not yet
provided the necessary certificate evidencing insurance coverage
and that defendants required such evidence under the terms of the
contract.
7.

The court find that defendants terminated plain-

tiff's services on October 2, 1990.
8.

The Court finds, that about 10% of the construc-

tion project was completed while plaintiff was general contractor
and, based on that percentage, defendants received a benefit from
plaintiff's pre-termination services in the amount of $10,000
regardless of whether plaintiff performed its duties under the
contract.
9.

The Court finds that defendants realized a benefit

of $5,500 which represents the amount saved by defendants through
plaintiff's services involving negotiations for the purchase of
lumber.

-3-
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes that the subject contract was

ambiguous and incomplete as drafted and that the Court has a
responsibility to add to it and to look upon it as an oral contract between the parties.
2.

The

Court

concludes

that

the

contract

can be

interpreted as written.
3.

The Court concludes that given the amount of the

subject contract and the cost of the construction, plaintiff had
a duty to inquire into the adequacy of its insurance coverage for
the project, but did not.
4.

The Court concludes that plaintiff's failure to

promptly provide evidence of adequate liability insurance was a
material breach of the contract.
5.

The Court concludes that defendants were justified

in terminating plaintiff's services for plaintiff's breach of its
obligation to promptly provide evidence of adequate liability
insurance.
6.

The Court concludes that defendants were justified

in terminating plaintiff's services because plaintiff spent very
few hours on the job site and did not give the construction
project the attention that it required under the contract and
that plaintiff knew Mr. Kurzet would expect.

-4-
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7.

The Court concludes that defendants are not in

breach of the contract in any way.
8.

With

respect

to

plaintiff's

Unjust

Enrichment

Claim, the Court has considered several alternative methods of
calculating any award to plaintiff under such a theory.

The

Court concludes the most logical basis to be the percentage of
defendants1 residence that was completed during the period plaintiff was on the job.
9.

The Court rejects plaintiff's proposal that it

should receive 1/4 or $25,000, of the $100,000 consideration contemplated under the contract because it spent three months on the
job, or one quarter, of the one-year period for constructing the
residence as contemplated under the contract.
that such a proposal

The Court finds

is unreasonable and unsupported by the

facts.
10.

The Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to

receive $15,500 from defendant in quantum meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between plaintiff and defendants,
$10,000 representing 1/10 of the contract price of $100,000 for
services in completing 1/10 of the construction, and $5,500 for
services involving negotiations for the purchase of lumber.
11.

The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to

defendant for the sum of $1,800 which represents defendants'

-5-
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costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendants1
east side retaining wall.
12.

The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to

defendants in the amount of $2,000 which represents defendants1
costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendants'
west side concrete steps.
13.

The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to

defendants in the amount of $559, which represents defendants'
costs for plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary Glu-Lam beams.
14.

The

Court

concludes

plaintiff

is entitled to

pre-judgment interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum,
from November 1, 1990, the date defendants terminated plaintiff's
services, to April 17, 1992, the date this Court granted plaintiffs'

Motion

to Compel

Filing

of Findings

of Fact,

and

post-judgment interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from and after April 17, 1992.
DATED this

&

day of

C&>£ - , 1992.

BY THE COURT:

HOMER WILKINSON
D i s t r i c t Court Judge

£ ^ J ? pTiE"- "
: Q ; K--J ~

' ^ i
O^

\fifiilrT&i^

IUCE J . NELSON
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f

'*'*'«IIMIIU»*0

WJE/052092A
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ADDENDUM B

ibiLED

SPENCER E. AUSTIN (0150)
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276)
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

OCT

7 1992

l~'

Clerk of Summit County

BY.

#

Deputy CleA

'^J>

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC. ,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
STANLEY M. KURZET, an
individual; STANLEY M. KURZET
and ANNE L. KURZET, as Trustees
for THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST;
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; and
John Does 1 through 10,

Civil No. 10870

Defendants.
* * * * * * * *

This action came on for trial before the Court, the
Honorable Homer Wilkinson, District Judge, presiding, and the
issues, having been duly tried to the Court, and the Court having
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That plaintiff recover from defendants in quantum

meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between plaintiff

BOCKNNPAGE 7 0 5
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and defendants, the amount of $11,141.00, with interest thereon
at the legal rate provided by law in accordance with paragraph 4
below, which represents $10,000 for services rendered in directing and supervising l/10th of the construction of defendants1
residence, and $5,500 for plaintiff's services involving negotiations for the purchase of lumber, adjusted by applying as an offset the following awards to defendants:
a.
dants1

costs

The sum of $1,800 which represents defen-

in repairing plaintiff's

faulty

construction of

defendants' east side retaining wall;
b.

The sum of $2,000 which represents defen-

dants' costs in repairing plaintiff's

faulty

construction of

defendants' west side concrete steps; and
c.

The sum of $559 which represents defendants'

costs caused by plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary materials;
2.

That defendants are not entitled to attorneys'

fees and costs attributable to defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment;
3.

That plaintiff is awarded $542.40 as its costs of

court itemized as follows :
a.

Filing fee, $75,00;

b.

Service of process fees, $32.25;

c.

Kurzet deposition; $311.15;

-2-
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4.

d.

Bailey/Kent depositions, $99.00; and

e.

Expert witness fee, $25.00.

That plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment inter-

est on $11,141.00 at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum for
the

period

from

November

1,

1990

to

April

17,

1992, and

post-judgment interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from and after April 17, 1992; and
5.

That

defendant's

counterclaims

are hereby dis-

missed with prejudice.
day of

DATED this

.

1992.

BY THE COURT:

/ -

HOMER WILKINSON
District Court Judge

i¥/

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

summIT

^
\J§
7/

r •=
V* ':-. COUNTY
'""'y'

3RUCE J. NELSON
Attorney for Plaintiff

'••••

'"'"illlHIS.***?*

WJE/052292B
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ADDENDUM C

U?tehC;,«4.«.w4tf

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

/ZZ2\2

MAY 3 1 1994

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Bailey-Allen Company, Inc.,

OPINION
(For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 930178-CA

Stanley M. Kurzet, an
individual; Stanley M. Kurzet
and Anne L. Kurzet, as
trustees for the Kurzet Family
Trust; The Kurzet Family
Trust; and John Does 1 through
10,

F I L E D
(May 31, 1994)

Defendants and Appellants.

Third District, Summit County
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
Attorneys:

Spencer E. Austin and William J. Evans, Salt Lake
City, for Appellants
Bruce J. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Orme.
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
Stanley Kurzet, Anne Kurzet, and the Kurzet Family Trust
appeal from a district court order awarding Bailey-Allen Company,
Inc., damages, prejudgment interest, and postjudgment interest
under a construction contract and denying the Kurzets' request
for attorney fees on their successful summary judgment motion.
We reverse and remand.
FACTS
In July 1990, Stanley Kurzet and Bailey-Allen Company, Inc.
entered into a contract for the construction of the Kurzets/
home. The agreement, which Mr. Kurzet drafted, provides in
relevant portion:

Uao9

This Agreement covers all of the
understandings existing between BAILEY-ALLEN
(Contractor) and STANLEY KURZET (Owner) for
the construction of a residence on LOT #4 of
the EVERGREEN development at DEER VALLEY,
PARK CITY, UTAH.
The Contractor is retained by Owner on a
cost plus fixed fee basis. Costs shall be
billed monthly and payment shall be made
within ten days of receipt of billing. The
fee fixed for this contract is set at
$100,000 for the residence as depicted in the
drawings plus a maximum of $50,000 in
directed additional work, if any. Any
directed additional work in excess of an
aggregate cost of $50,000 will result in
additional fees based on 7% of the cost of
such additional work.

Both Contractor and Owner stipulate that
this contract cannot be changed except and
unless in writing, bearing the date and
signatures of both parties.

The Owner's review authority
notwithstanding, the Contractor is fully
responsible to Owner for the performance of
subcontractors. Accordingly, costs
occasioned by the failure of a subcontractor
to perform shall not be assessable to Owner.
The Contractor shall carry insurance
specifically providing for saving Owner
harmless from any action arising due to the
injury of a worker even if an employ[ee] of a
subcontractor or supplier who is not properly
or adequately insured. Contractor shall,
within 10 days of the date of this agreement
furnish a Certificate of Insurance prepared
by the Carrier or its Authorized Agent. The
Certificate shall specifically state the
purpose and limits of the policy and these
shall show that the work to be performed
under this contract is covered.
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Contractor takes note that Owner is
concerned about the quality of workmanship
and materials and that this concern stems
from prior experience with a local contractor
and ownership of several condominiums at the
Pinnacle development. Owner will not make
unreasonable demands, however, slovenly
workmanship and/or substandard materials will
neither be accepted [n]or paid for by Owner.
Owner considers that the fees he pays to
Contractor are specifically for his expertise
in selecting and supervising workers so as to
avoid unacceptable and substandard
workmanship and/or the use of substandard
quality materials.
The agreement is silent regarding remedies in the event of a
breach by either party.
Ten days after the contract was signed, Mr. Kurzet requested
the required certificate of insurance, but never received it.
Bailey-Allen later admitted that its policy had expired nearly
two years earlier. In October 1990, Mr. Kurzet terminated
Bailey-Allen's services, based on its failure to provide proof of
insurance and Mr. Kurzet's dissatisfaction with Bailey-Allen's
attention to the project. At the time of the termination, the
work under the contract was approximately 10% complete, with the
house framed and the roof partially finished.
Bailey-Allen filed a complaint against the Kurzets in
December 1990, alleging breach of contract, mechanics' lien,
unjust enrichment, and failure to obtain a construction bond.
The trial court subsequently granted the Kurzets' motion for
partial summary judgment on the latter three causes of action,
reserving the breach of contract cTaim for trial to the bench.
At the trial on the breach of contract claim, the court
reinstated sua sponte the unjust enrichment claim and granted a
continuance for the parties to present their evidence thereupon.
After hearing the evidence, the court determined "that the
subject contract was ambiguous and incomplete as drafted and that
the Court has a responsibility to add to it." The court further
concluded that Bailey-Allen's failure to provide evidence of
insurance and its lack of supervision of the project were
material breaches of the contract that justified the termination.
The court determined the Kurzets had not breached the contract.
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The trial court then concluded that Bailey-Allen was
entitled to recover under its unjust enrichment theory and went
on to consider the amount of damages due, concluding that "the
most logical basis [was] the percentage of defendants/ residence
that was completed during the period plaintiff was on the job."
Accordingly, the court awarded Bailey-Allen $15,500 "in quantum
meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between plaintiff
and defendants, $10,000 representing 1/10 of the contract price
for services in completing 1/10 of the construction, and $5,500
for services involving negotiations for the purchase of lumber."
Bailey-Allen was held liable to the Kurzets for $1800 in costs
for repairing Bailey-Allen's faulty construction of a retaining
wall, for $2000 for repairing its faulty construction of concrete
steps, and for $559 in costs for unnecessary materials.
The court entered judgment for Bailey-Allen in the amount of
$11,141, representing its damages offset by the amounts owed to
the Kurzets. The court awarded Bailey-Allen prejudgment interest
and postjudgment interest from and after April 17, 1992, the date
the trial court granted Bailey-Allen's motion to compel findings
of fact and conclusions of law. The court dismissed the Kurzets'
counterclaims and denied their claim for attorney fees and costs
associated with their successful motion for partial summary
judgment on the mechanics' lien and construction bond claims.
The Kurzets appeal, claiming the trial court erred in: (1)
awarding Bailey-Allen damages under the contract or in quantum
meruit; (2) awarding prejudgment interest; (3) awarding
postjudgment interest from the date it granted Bailey-Allen's
motion to compel findings of facts and conclusions of law, rather
than from the date the judgment was entered; and (4) denying
their claim for attorney fees and costs on their successful
partial summary judgment motion under the mechanics' lien and
construction bond statutes.
I.

DAMAGE AWARD

The trial court awarded Bailey-Allen $15,500 in damages "in
quantum meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between
the parties."1 Whether the court's theory of recovery was proper
raises a question of law, which this court reviews for
correctness. Van Dvke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah
1. Bailey-Allen argues that the award of $10,000 was "clearly
awarded pursuant to the construction contract [and not] under an
^unjust enrichment' theory." However, the basis of the award is
not as clear as Bailey-Allen suggests, particularly in light of
the wording of the judgment.
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1991) . We are also mindful that we may affirm a trial courts
decision on any proper ground. Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte
Vista Ranch, Inc.. 758 P.2d 451, 456 (Utah App.), cert, denied.
769 P.2d 819 (Utah 1988); accord Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc..
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). Therefore, we can affirm the
award if we find any proper basis to support it.
A.

Recovery Under the Contract

We first look at the written contract to determine whether
its terms justify the damage award. In evaluating the contract,
this court must first ascertain whether the contract was
integrated and second whether it was ambiguous. Ron Case Roofing
& Asphalt Paving. Inc. v. Blomguist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah
1989) . Neither party argued that the contract was not
integrated, and it expressly states that it was the entire
understanding of the parties and could not be changed except in
writing. Regarding ambiguity, however, the contract provided no
guidance relevant to the proper remedy for breach. As such, the
contract was ambiguous or, more accurately, silent as to the
intent of the parties regarding remedies in case of breach.
Furthermore, no extrinsic evidence shed light on what remedies
the parties intended in the event of a breach.
In the absence of any express contract provision or
extrinsic evidence of intent, we look to a rule set forth in an
early supreme court case for guidance in our analysis: "In an
action upon the contract [the contractor] cannot recover unless
and until he [or she] shows that he [or she] has, substantially
at least, complied with its provisions." Ryan v. Curlew
Irrigation & Reservoir Co., 36 Utah 382, 391, 104 P^ 218, 221
(1909) (emphasis added); see also Reliance Ins. v. Utah Dept. of
Transp.. 858 P.2d 1363, 1370 (Utah 1991) (discussing doctrine of
substantial completion, but holding it inapplicable on facts of
case). Professor Corbin states this rule as follows: "[W]hen a
contract has been made for an agreed exchange of two
performances, one of which is to be-rendered first, the rendition
of this one substantially in full is a constructive condition
precedent to the duty of the other party to render his [or her]
part of the exchange." 3A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts
§ 700, at 309 (1960).
However, "[i]f the defective performance, though less than
* substantial' has conferred benefits on the defendant in excess
of his [or her] injury, he [or she] may be under a quasicontractual duty to pay that excess." Id. § 700, at 310. Thus,
[a] contractor whose breach is such that he
[or she] has rendered less than "substantial
performance" has no right to the contract
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price; he [or she] is said to have no remedy
"on the contract" . . . .
The contractor's
right is a right to reasonable compensation
for value received by the defendant over and
above the injury suffered by the contractor's
breach.
Id. § 710, at 342.
Applying this principle, we conclude neither the court's
findings nor the underlying evidence establish that Bailey-Allen
substantially performed under the contract. The court found only
that what work was accomplished had come about regardless of
whether Bailev-Allen performed. Furthermore, the court
acknowledged that Bailey-Allen was "not performing" certain
aspects of the contract, in addition to failing to obtain
insurance. Even if we attribute to Bailey-Allen the 10% of the
work completed during its three-month tenure, it still does not
constitute substantial performance. Because Bailey-Allen failed
to substantially perform as required by the contract, it cannot
recover under the contract.
B.

Recovery in Quantum Meruit

The Kurzets argue that the existence of a written contract
bars an action in quantum meruit. They are correct that recovery
in quantum meruit typically presupposes that no enforceable
written or oral contract exists. Karaoanos v. Boardwalk Fries,
Inc., 837 P.2d 576, 578 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042
(Utah 1992); accord Davies v. Olson. 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah App.
1987). However, as explained above, there is no enforceable
contract between Bailey-Allen and the Kurzets. Thus, recovery
under quantum meruit may be appropriate.
As discussed earlier, a non-breaching party is discharged
from its contract duties but may h§ye a quasi-contractual duty to
pay the value of the benefit conferred in excess of the damage
caused by the contractor's breach. Corbin §§ 700, at 309-10,
707, at 329. The Utah Supreme Court employed an analogous
approach in Lowe v. Rosenlof, 12 Utah 2d 190, 364 P.2d 418
(1961) , suggesting that recovery in quantum meruit is appropriate
to compensate a breaching contractor for pre-breach work
performed. The court stated that while a breaching contractor
"is not entitled to the benefits of the contract, he [or she] is,
nevertheless, entitled to payment on a quantum meruit basis for
the work which he [or she] did perform." Id., 12 Utah 2d at 19495, 364 P.2d at 421; see also Backus v. Apishapa Land & Cattle
Co., 615 P.2d 42, 44 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980); Eckes v. Luce, 173 P.
219, 220 (Okla. 1918).
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Quantum meruit has two branches, both rooted in justice.
Davies. 746 P.2d at 269; accord Scheller v. Dixie Six Corp.. 753
P.2d 971, 975 (Utah App. 1988). The branch applicable to this
case is a contract implied in law, also known as quasi-contract
or unjust enrichment, which is a legal action in restitution.
Davies, 746 P.2d at 269. To prove a contract implied in law or
unjust enrichment, the following must be shown: "(1) the
defendant received a benefit; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by
the defendant of the benefit; (3) under circumstances that would
make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without
paying for it." Id.; accord Backus. 615 P.2d at 44. The benefit
conferred on the defendant, and not the plaintiff's detriment or
the reasonable value of its services, is the measure of recovery.
Davies, 746 P.2d at 269; accord Scheller, 753 P.2d at 975.
The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law do
not specifically address the three requirements for recovery
under unjust enrichment, nor do the undisputed underlying facts
make clear that a quasi-contract award is appropriate. Instead
the court's findings are internally inconsistent. For example,
the trial court concluded that Bailey-Allen conferred a $10,000
benefit "regardless of whether plaintiff performed its duties
under the contract." The Kurzets argue persuasively that BaileyAllen does not satisfy the first element of the Davies test
because Bailey-Allen conferred no benefit upon them. The trial
court seemed to agree, at least in theory, in finding that the
10% of the work completed during Bailey-Allen's tenure was not
necessarily due to its presence or performance.
It is equally unclear whether the second element of the
Davies test was satisfied. Mr. Kurzet's testimony suggests he
failed to realize any benefit conferred directly by Bailey-Allen.
In fact, the core of the Kurzets' defense is that Bailey-Allen
failed to perform any of the material terms of the contract and
that any portion of the project completed was accomplished by
other parties. Furthermore, the trial court found that BaileyAllen did not give the project th^attention Mr. Kurzet demanded.
Finally, under the third element, the trial court did not find
explicitly that it would be unjust to allow the Kurzets to
retain, without payment, the construction completed before
Bailey-Allen was terminated.
We are simply unable to determine whether the trial court's
award of $10,000 "in quantum meruit/unjust enrichment" was
predicated on the proper legal standard. We therefore reverse
the award and remand for analysis and findings under the standard
articulated in Davies. The trial court should make detailed,
consistent findings on each of the three required elements and
allow recovery only if all three are satisfied.
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C.

Measure of Damages

If the trial court determines on remand that an award is
warranted, we offer the following guidance for assessing the
measure of damages. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
suggests a measure of damages referred to as "restitution in
favor of party in breach." Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 374 (1981). Section 374 states that the breaching party is
liable for the loss caused by the breach, but may recover the
benefit conferred if it exceeds that loss. Id. The party
seeking restitution must prove the measure of that benefit. Id.
Therefore, if on remand the trial court determines that
recovery under quantum meruit is appropriate, it must make
findings on the damages caused by Bailey-Allen's breach. The
court should also make particularized findings on any benefit
conferred on the Kurzets by Bailey-Allen, including its
supervision as the general contractor and its involvement in
negotiating the purchase price of the lumber at issue. We note
that the court should make certain that any benefit conferred in
negotiating the price of the lumber must be somehow in addition
to the benefits Bailey-Allen conferred by virtue of performing
its contractual duty to supervise the project. Bailey-Allen
should ultimately recover only the benefit conferred in excess of
the damage it caused. We also note that the percentage of the
work completed, if it resulted from Bailey-Allen's efforts, is
not an unreasonable measure of the benefit conferred. See
Darrell J. Didericksen & Sons, Inc. v. Magna Water & Sewer, 613
P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1980) (noting trial court may determine
recovery "on the basis of the contract price, or on.the
reasonable value, of the portion of the project already completed
and not paid for"); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
374 (1981) (deeming contract price inconclusive evidence of
benefit conferred and stating "in no case will the party in
breach be allowed to recover more than a ratable portion of the
total contract price where such a portion can be determined").
II.

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST

The Kurzets next claim that the trial court improperly
awarded Bailey-Allen prejudgment interest. Because we vacate the
judgment, we deal with this issue only for the benefit of the
trial court if it concludes on remand that a judgment under
quantum meruit is proper.
A trial court's decision on "entitlement to prejudgment
interest presents a question of law which we review for
correctness." Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.. 848 P.2d
171, 177 (Utah App. 1993). The Utah Supreme Court recently
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reiterated the rule that prejudgment interest is properly awarded
when "the loss had been fixed as of a definite time and the
amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy
in accordance with well-established rules of damages." Bellon v.
Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991). The court also noted
^v^t prejudgment interest is typically not allowed in cases of
equitable relief that '"address themselves to the conscience and
discretion of the trial court.,fl Id. (quoting Fullmer v. Blood.
546 P.za 606f 610 (Utah 1976)).
This c^urt has previously rejected a claim for prejudgment
interest on an unjust enrichment award. Shoreline Dev.. Inc. v.
Utah County. 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. 1992). We noted that
"the lack of mathematical certainty generally prevents an award
of prejudgment interest in equity claims." Id. We conclude that
any damages in this case cannot be fixed at a particular time and
with accuracy. Smith v, Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 1225
(Utah App. 1990). Therefore, even if recovery in quantum meruit
is awarded on remand, no prejudgment interest should be awarded.
III.

POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST2

The Kurzets also appeal the award of postjudgment interest
at 12% per annum from and after April 17, 1992, the date upon
which the trial court granted Bailey-Allen's motion to compel
findings, conclusions, and judgment.3 They claim that
postjudgment interest, if appropriate at all, should accrue only
as of the date a judgment is entered. We review the award of
postjudgment interest, a question of law, under the .correction of
error standard. £f. Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.. 848
P.2d 171, 177 (Utah App. 1993) (applying same standard of review
to prejudgment interest).

2. If the trial court does not award damages on remand, then
there will be no basis for post-judgment interest. We therefore
offer the following guidance only in the event that damages are
awarded.
3. Apparently the delay in filing the findings, conclusions, and
judgment occurred because the Kurzets obtained new counsel. As
soon as the substitution of counsel took place, the documents
were filed. Bailey-Allen argues that it was appropriate for the
trial court to "penalize" the Kurzets for this delay. The
Kurzets counter that Bailey-Allen could have sought sanctions for
the delay and that the trial court should not have penalized them
in this fashion for delaying the entry of the judgment.
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Our decision in Mason v. Western Mortgage, 754 P.2d 984
(Utah App. 1988), disposes of this issue. In Mason, this court
held that postjudgment interest dates from the entry of a new
judgment upon remand. Id. at 987. Moreover, we cited with
approval a California case holding that •• *[a] judgment bears
legal interest from the date of its entry in the trial couri»/ff
Id. at 986 (quoting Stockton Theatres. Inc. v. Palermo, -?crO p.2d
76, 78 (Cal. 1961)).
Mason dictates that any postjudgment interest awarded in
this case should run only from the date of the new judgment on
remand. Id. at 987. We therefore reverse th* *ward of
postjudgment interest from April 17, 1992 and remand for the
entry of postjudgment interest, if damages are awarded, only from
the date the new judgment is entered.4
IV.

ATTORNEY FEES

Finally, the Kurzets challenge the trial c o u r t s denial of
their request for attorney fees and costs attributable to their
successful motion for partial summary judgment. On September 24,
1991, the trial court granted the Kurzets' motion for partial
summary judgment on the mechanics' lien and construction bond
causes of action. At that time, the court "reserved for future
determination" the request for attorney fees and costs. Although
the Kurzets subsequently filed an Affidavit of Attorney Fees and
Costs and requested such fees on several occasions, the trial
court never determined the amount of fees and ultimately denied
without explanation the request for attorney fees and costs
attributable to the successful motion for partial summary
judgment.
In most cases, attorney fees are appropriately awarded only
if authorized by statute or contract. Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1358). The Mechanics' Lien
statute provides: "In any action brought to enforce any lien
4. To avoid confusion on remand, we wish to make clear that any
post-judgment interest should run from the date that the new
judgment is entered, rather than orally rendered. See Utah R.
App. P. 32; Mason, 754 P.2d at 987; see also National Steel
Const, Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.. 543 P.2d 642, 644-45
(Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (concluding entry of judgment and not oral
ruling liquidates damages because oral ruling subject to change
before entry); Pure Gas & Chem. Co. v. Cook. 526 P.2d 986, 993
(Wyo. 1974) (concluding verdict is not final liquidation of sum
due until judgment entered and awarding post-judgment interest
from date of entry).
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under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to
recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court,
which shall be taxed as costs in the action." Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-1-18 (1988) (emphasis added). Bailey-Allen concedes that
section 38-1-18 applies and apparently does not dispute that this
is an action "to enforce any lien." Id. The issue, then, is
whether attorney fees must be awarded under the statutory scheme.
In Rotta v. Hawk. 756 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1988), this court
observed that a lien foreclosure action satisfied the
requirements of section 38-1-18. Id. at 716. Furthermore, the
supreme court has previously ruled that the benefit of attorney
fees under the statute is conferred upon "the successful party,"
which may include the party who defended against the lien.
Palombi v. D & C Builders. 22 Utah 2d 297, 300-01, 452 P.2d 325,
327-28 (1969). Therefore the Kurzets, as the successful party,
were entitled to attorney fees.
We thus conclude that the trial court erred in denying the
Kurzets' request for attorney fees under the Mechanics' Lien
statute, and we remand for a determination of the amount of
reasonable attorney fees. For guidance in calculating that
amount, we direct the trial court to Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d
at 989-90 (establishing "practical guidelines" for evaluating
evidence of reasonable attorney fees).
Attorney fees under the Bond Statute may also be warranted.
The Bond Statute states: "In an action for failure to obtain a
bond, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party." Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(3) (1992) (emphasis
added). Bailey-Allen is apparently correct, then, that section
14-2-2(3) endows the trial court with discretion in awarding
attorney fees. We must therefore determine whether the trial
court's denial of those fees constituted an abuse of discretion.
Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993) (awarding
attorney fees under contract) . Hoover, in order for this court
to conduct a meaningful review of that determination, we must
rely on adequate findings of fact, Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d
143, 155-56 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah
1993), which are absent in this case.
Consequently, the trial court's failure to set forth its
basis for denying the requested attorney fees was an abuse of
discretion, and we remand for the entry of findings supporting
the decision to award or deny attorney fees under the Bond
statute. When determining whether attorney fees should be
awarded under the Bond Statute, the trial court should consider
precedent treating the Bond Statute as auxiliary to the
Mechanics' Lien Statute and as sharing with it a common purpose.
See King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13 Utah 2d 339, 341,
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374 P.2d 254, 255-56 (1962); Rio Grande Lumber v. Darke, 50 Utah
114, 124, 167 P. 241, 245 (1917). Those cases suggest that it is
generally appropriate to award reasonable attorney fees under the
Bond Statute when fees are awarded under the Mechanics' Lien
Statute.
CONCLUSION
Bailey-Allen was not entitled to recover damages under the
contract. However, it may be entitled to recover in quantum
meruit. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the entry of
findings consistent with this opinion and, if those findings
support an award in quantum meruit, for the entry of a judgment.
We reverse the award of prejudgment interest, and we direct the
trial court to award postjudgment interest, if a judgment is
awarded, only from the date the new judgment on remand is
entered. Finally, we reverse and remand for the entry of
attorney fees under the Mechanics' Lien Statute and for
consideration of whether they should be awarded under the Bond
Statute.
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FILED
JUN 1 3 1996
ClerK of Summit Gounty

Bruce J. Nelson (2380)
ALLEN NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
215 South State, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8400
Attorneys for Plaintiff

By.
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IN THE TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

STANLEY M. KURZET, an individual;
STANLEY M. KURZET and ANNE L.
KURZET, as Trustees for the Kurzet
Family Trust; THE KURZET FAMILY
TRUST; and JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH
10,

Civil No. 10870

Defendant.

This matter was tried to the Court on December 18 and 19, 1991 and January 30,
1992.

Having considered the evidence, testimony and exhibits produced at trial and the

arguments of counsel, this Court previously entered its original Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment on October 6, 1992. Defendants subsequently appealed the Court's
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment.
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On May 24, 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision reversing this
Court's prior decision and remanding the matter to this Court for additional consideration.
Subsequently on January 23, 1995, Judge Glenn Iwasaki of this Court entered
Judgment in favor of Defendants in the amount of $1,937.50 for attorneys fees in connection
with previously dismissed mechanic's lien and bonding statute causes of action.
Pursuant to motion of the Plaintiff that this Court enter Amended Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Amended Judgment pursuant to the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals, this Court has carefully reviewed the pleadings and documents on file herein,
including the transcript of proceedings at trial. The Court has further reconsidered its original
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment pursuant to the direction of the Utah Court of Appeals
decision dated May 24, 1994.
Further, on November 21, 1995, this Court also heard and considered oral argument by
counsel for the parties on the issues relating to Plaintiffs motion to reconsider the matter.
The Court acknowledges that through mis-communication between itself and counsel for the
parties, the original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were inadequate and the Court
desires to clarify its findings, conclusions and decision based upon the evidence. As a result,
the following Amended Findings of Fact and Amended Conclusions of Law supcracye the
original Findings and Conclusions entered by the Court prior to Defendants' appeal.
Accordingly, the Court now makes and enters the following:
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AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that the parties intended to and did enter into a written contract

("Contract") wherein Plaintiff agreed to act as the general contractor and to oversee
construction of Defendants' residence in Park City, Utah.

The Contract called for a

construction period of one year.
2.

The Court finds that Defendant Stanley M. Kurzet drafted the written Contract.

3.

The Court finds that the Contract between the parties provided that Plaintiff

would complete construction on Defendants' residence within one year and, in return,
Defendants would pay Plaintiff $100,000 consideration for Plaintiffs general contractor
services in directing and supervising the construction, and $22.00 per hour for Plaintiffs own
hands on labor.
4.

The Court finds that the Defendants had experienced problems with prior

contractors on the residence and that Plaintiff was aware that Defendants had already
terminated two earlier general contractors for unsatisfactory performance. Plaintiff was also
aware that Stanley M. Kurzet was a meticulous ancFdemanding individual and would require
exacting performance of the Contract.
5.

The Court finds that Plaintiff thereafter commenced performing its duties under

the Contract. Plaintiff performed some direct hands on labor to the project and was paid for
such work by Defendants. Plaintiff also performed services related to the services of a
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general contractor. Plaintiff has received no compensation for such general contractor
services.
6.

The Court finds that the parties also intended, and the Contract provided, for

Plaintiff to provide Defendants with evidence of adequate liability insurance covering its work
pursuant to the Contract. Such evidence of insurance was to have been provided by Plaintiff
within ten (10) days of execution of the Contract.
7.

The Court finds that Plaintiff represented to Defendants that Plaintiff had one

million dollars in liability insurance coverage in force at the time the parties entered into the
contract on July 3, 1990, that Defendants wanted such insurance increased to four or five
million in coverage, and that Plaintiff later discovered its policy was only for three hundred
thousand dollars and that it had been cancelled on October 24, 1989.
8.

The Court finds that, in a memorandum of July 20, 1990 from Defendants to

Plaintiff which was delivered to Michael Kent, Defendants notified Plaintiff that it had not yet
provided the necessary certificate evidencing insurance coverage and that Defendants required
such evidence under the terms of the Contract.
9.

The Court finds that Plaintiff did not subsequently provide the required

certificate of insurance to the Defendants.
10.

The Court finds that Plaintiff did not give the construction project the attention

that Plaintiff knew Mr. Kurzet would expect or demand.
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11.

The Court finds that some construction mistakes occurred during the course of

construction, causing Defendants subsequent damage for repairs, etc. in the total amount of
$4,359.00 and detailed as follows:
a.

the sum of $1,800 in connection with the construction of Defendants'

east side retaining wall;
b.

the sum of $2,000 in connection with the construction of Defendants'

west side concrete steps; and
c.

the sum of $559 in materials ordered for the job by Plaintiff but which

were subsequently deemed to be unnecessary.
12.

The Court finds that Defendants terminated Plaintiffs services on October 2,

1990, after three months of work on the construction project by Plaintiff;
13.

The Court finds that there is no provision in the Contract relating to the

measure of damages in the event of default thereof by either party.
14.

The Court finds that during the three month period that the Contract was in

effect, Michael Kent of the Plaintiff was on the construction site approximately thirty (30)
hours per week. In addition, Mr. Richard Allen of the Plaintiff visited the construction site,
practically every day for some period of time^ x>\x V\\s ov^tv. Ve.s\?imo»svx .
15.

y(*

The Court finds that Mr. Allen was also available on his mobile phone when

not on site and made or received daily calls concerning the job.

Iil6

16.

The Court finds that Mr. Allen also spent considerable time at his home in the

evening making calls, setting up appointments and contacting other contractors in connection
with the job.
17.

The Court finds that during the three month period that the Contract was in

effect, Plaintiff performed general contractor services, including the hiring of subcontractors,
overseeing the work of subcontractors, getting bids on retaining walls, windows, cabinets and
other items, meeting with people, including building inspectors, and generally coordinating the
work on the job.
18.

The Court finds that during the time Plaintiff was the general contractor of the

project, the residence progressed from a concrete slab to a point where the roof was ready to
be completed on the multi-story residence. Based upon the testimony of Defendants' expert
witness, the Court finds that 10% of the construction project contemplated by the Contract
was completed during the time Plaintiff was general contractor.
19.

The Court finds that Defendant Stanley Kurzet was regularly on the job site,

often as much as six (6) hours a day. He personally-observed the progress on the home.

As

a result, Defendants were aware of the progress of the home while Plaintiff was the general
contractor and was aware of the benefit Defendants received as a result of Plaintiffs services.
20.

The Court finds that at no time during the three month period in which the

Contract was in effect did Defendants express any dissatisfaction with the work or progress on
the job. On at least one occasion Stanley Kurzet expressed to Plaintiff that he was satisfied
6
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with the way the work was going. Defendants did not attempt to stop Plaintiff from
completing the Contract until Defendant Stanley Kurzet terminated the same in connection the
insurance matter.
21.

The Court finds that Defendant Kurzet acknowledged at trial that Plaintiff was

the general contractor on the job during the time in which the work was completed which was
the subject of Plaintiff s Complaint.
22.

The Court finds that after commencing its duties under the Contract, Plaintiff

also inventoried and hand counted all lumber at the site which had been ordered by a prior
contractor. Plaintiff thereafter engaged in successful negotiations and settlement of a dispute
with the vendor of such lumber over the amount owing thereon.
23.

The Court finds that Defendants received a benefit of $5,500 through Plaintiffs

settlement of the dispute over the amount owed on the prior lumber order. Defendants were
aware of Plaintiff s involvement in such matter and were aware of the $5,500 savings which
they thereby received.
From the foregoing Amended Findings of-Faet, the Court now makes and enters the
following:
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes that the parties entered into a valid and binding Contract

on July 3, 1990 for the construction of Defendants' residence in Park City, Utah. Under the
terms thereof, Plaintiff was obligated to perform certain services and duties as general
7
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contractor of the construction and Defendants were similarly obligated to pay Plaintiff for
services rendered under the Contract.
2.

The Court concludes that given that amount of the Contract and the cost of the

construction, Plaintiff had a duty to inquire into the adequacy of its insurance coverage for the
project, but did not do so.
3.

The Court concludes that Defendants were justified in terminating Plaintiffs

services under the Contract as a result of Plaintiffs breach of its obligation to promptly
provide evidence of adequate liability insurance.
4.

The Court concludes that Defendants were not in breach of the Contract in any

way at the time Plaintiff was terminated as general contractor for the project.
5.

The Court finds that prior to Plaintiffs termination as general contractor, it had

not substantially completed their duties under the Contract. As a result, Plaintiff is not
entitled to recover under the Contract.
6.

The Court concludes that the parties intended under the Contract that Plaintiff

would be responsible for the actions of subcontracted on the job and responsible to
Defendants for any mistakes made by such subcontractors. Conversely, the Court concludes
that the parties also intended that Plaintiff should also be attributed with the benefits of any
cumulative work done by subcontractors on the project.
7.

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs services as general contractor conferred a

benefit to the Defendants.
8
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8.

The Court concludes that the Defendants were aware of the benefit conferred as

a result of Plaintiffs general contractor services through its actual on-site observation and
satisfaction of the work performed.
9.

The Court concludes that under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the

Defendants to retain the benefit received without payment for the same.
10.

The Court concludes that on the basis of contract implied in law, quasi-contract

or unjust enrichment, Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the Defendants the value of the
benefit conferred upon Defendants, less any damages resulting from Plaintiffs breach of the
Contract.
11.

The Court rejects Plaintiffs argument that it had earned and should receive

one-fourth, or $25,000, of the $100,000 fee because it had spent three months on the job, or
one quarter of the one year period for construction contemplated under the Contract. The
Court finds that such a position is unreasonable and unsupported by the facts.
12.

The Court concludes that the proper and appropriate measure of the benefit

conferred upon Defendants is the pro-rata portion-e£-the fee previously agreed in the Contract.
Based upon the testimony of Defendants expert witness, one-tenth of construction
contemplated by the Contract was completed and as a result, Plaintiff conferred a benefit upon
Defendants in the amount of $10,000.
13.

The Court concludes that the Defendants suffered no damage as a result of

Plaintiffs failure to supply the required proof of insurance. As a result, no reduction to
9
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Plaintiffs recovery should be made in Defendants' favor for such element of the breach of
Contract.
14.

The Court concludes that Defendants did suffer damage resulting from

construction mistakes made while Plaintiff was the general contractor. The damage resulting
from such construction mistakes is the amount of $4,359, which amount should be deducted
from any amounts otherwise owing to the Plaintiff.
15.

On January 21, 1995, Judge Glenn Iwasaki of this Court entered Judgment in

favor of Defendants relating to attorneys fees incurred in the prior dismissal of the mechanic's
lien and bonding statute claims. The current balance of such Judgment is $2,170 and such
amount should also be deducted from any amounts otherwise owing to the Plaintiff. As a
result, such prior Judgment should be deemed satisfied.
16.

Except as set forth above, Defendants suffered no additional damage resulting

from Plaintiffs breach of the Contract and there are no other deductions applicable to
amounts otherwise owing to the Plaintiff.
17.

Negotiation of the disputed lumbeH5ftl left over from prior contractor was not

within the scope of the Contract.
18.

The Court concludes that with respect to the inventorying and negotiation of a

settlement on the disputed prior lumber bill, Plaintiff conferred a benefit upon the Defendants
in the amount of $5,500, which benefit is in addition to the benefit conferred by Plaintiffs'
completion of ten percent of the construction. The Court concludes that Defendants were
10
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aware of Plaintiffs actions with respect thereto and that it would be unjust to allow
Defendants to retain such benefit without payment of a reasonable fee to Plaintiff for such
benefit. Accordingly, the Court finds that a fee of one-half the savings on the lumber bill, or
$2,750, is fair and reasonable under the circumstances. The Court finds this result particularly
fair and reasonable inasmuch as the Court has deducted from Plaintiffs recovery the cost of
extra materials Plaintiff ordered for the job which were ultimately found to be unnecessary.
19.

Plaintiff should also be entitled to post-judgment interest as allowed by law

from and after the entry of Judgment. No pre-judgment interest is appropriate under Utah
law.
20.

Plaintiff should also be entitled to its costs of court incurred in prosecuting this

action in the amount of $542.40.
DATED this / / _ _ day of

/7^*~^

, 1996.

BY THE COURT
^^2Homff* Wilkinson
Third District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this 2-1

day of April, 1996,1 caused to be hand delivered

a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following:
Spencer E. Austin, Esq.
William J. Evans, Esq.

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898

bjn\bailcy\ffcl pie

12

l±23

ADDENDUM E

FTLTD
*«« I 3 1996
Bruce J. Nelson (2380)
ALLEN NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
215 South State, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8400
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC.,
AMENDED JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.

STANLEY M. KURZET, an individual;
STANLEY M. KURZET and ANNE L.
KURZET, as Trustees for the Kurzet
Family Trust; THE KURZET FAMILY
TRUST; and JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH
10,

Civil No. 10870

Defendant.

This matter was tried to the Court on December 18 and 19, 1991 and January 30,
1992. Having considered the evidence, testimony and exhibits produced at trial, and the
arguments of counsel, the Court previously entered its original Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, as well as a Judgment on October 6, 1992. Defendants subsequently
appealed the Court's Findings, Conclusions and Judgment.
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On May 24, 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision reversing the Court's
prior decision and remanding the matter to this Court for additional consideration.
Pursuant to motion of the Plaintiff that the Court enter Amended Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Amended Judgment pursuant to the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals, this Court has carefully reviewed the pleadings and documents on file herein,
including the transcript of proceedings at trial. The Court has further reconsidered its original
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment pursuant to the direction of the Utah Court of Appeals'
decision dated May 24, 1994. Also, on November 21, 1995, this Court further considered
oral argument by counsel for the parties on Plaintiffs motion to reconsider the matter.
The Court having now entered its Amended Findings of Fact and Amended
Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff is granted Judgment against the Defendants in the amount of

$6,763.40. Such amount represents the amount of $13,292.40 ($10,000 earned by the
Plaintiff for services rendered in directing and supervising 1/10th of the construction of
Defendants' residence, $2,750.00 as the reasonable value of Plaintiff s services involving
negotiations for payment of a disputed lumber bill incurred by a prior contractor, and $542.40
in costs of court expended by Plaintiff in this matter) offset by the following credits to
Defendants in the total amount of $6,529.00:

2
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a.

the sum of $1,800.00 which represents Defendants' costs in repairing

Plaintiffs faulty construction of Defendants' east side retaining wall;
b.

the sum of $2,000.00 which represents Defendants' costs in repairing

Plaintiffs faulty construction of Defendants' west side concrete steps;
c.

the sum of $559.00 which represents Defendants' costs caused by

Plaintiffs ordering three unnecessary materials; and
d.

the sum of $2,170.00 representing the current balance (including

accrued interest) of a prior Judgment rendered against Plaintiff January 23, 1995 by
Judge Glenn Iwasaki in Defendants' favor relating to attorney's fees and costs of
Defendants' prior successful Motion for Summary Judgment on the mechanic's lien
and bonding statute causes of action. As a result of this credit, the prior Judgment of
January 23, 1995 is satisfied.
2.

Plaintiff is further entitled to interest on its Judgment at the legal rate

applicable to judgments from and after the date of entry hereof.
3.

Defendants' counterclaims are herebyuiismissed with prejudice.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this ,2f

day of April, 1996,1 caused to be hand delivered

a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED JUDGMENT to the following:
Spencer E. Austin, Esq.
William J. Evans, Esq.

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898

JJ

bjn\bailey\amenjudg pie

1127

__LA5^^.

ADDENDUM F

No.

F I LED
SPENCER E. AUSTIN (0150)
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs,

[DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED]
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

STANLEY M. KURZET, an
Individual; STANLEY M. KURZET
and ANNE L. KURZET, as
Trustees for the Kurzet Family
Trust; THE KURZET FAMILY
TRUST; and JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH
10,

Civil No. 90-03-10870

Defendants
* * * * * * *

This matter was tried to the Court on December 18 and 19,
1991 and on January 30, 1992.

Having considered the evidence,

testimony and exhibits produced at trial, and the arguments of
counsel,

the

Court

entered

its

original

Findings

Conclusions of Law, and Judgment on October 6, 1992.

of

Fact,

Defendants

appealed the Court's findings, conclusions and judgment that were
in favor of plaintiff.
On May 24, 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its
decision reversing this Court's decision in favor of plaintiff and
remanding the matter to this Court for additional consideration.
236991 1
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On January 23, 1995, Judge Glenn Iwasaki of this Court
entered judgment in favor of defendants in the amount of $1,937.50
for attorneys' fees for successfully defending plaintiff's claims
under the mechanic's lien and the bond statutes.
On July 25, 1995, defendants filed a Motion for Entry of
Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc and a supporting memorandum.
on

August

24,

1995,

plaintiff

filed

a

Motion

In response,
for

Entry

of

Additional and Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, and a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc. At the same time, plaintiff filed
a Motion to Set Aside the Court's Prior Order Dismissing

the

Mechanic's

for

Lien

Cause

of

Action

and

Attorney's Fees in Favor of Defendants.

Resulting

Judgment

In response to plaintiff's

Motion to Set Aside the Prior Order Dismissing the Mechanic's Lien
Cause of Action, defendants filed a Memorandum in Opposition and a
Motion

for

Sanctions

under

Rule

11.

Plaintiff

subsequently

withdrew that Motion.
On November 21, 1995, this Court heard and considered
oral argument by counsel for the parties on issues relating to
defendants' Motion for Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc, plaintiff's
Motion for Entry of Additional and Amended Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law and defendants' Motion for Sanctions Under Rule
11.

The

Findings

Court
of

inadequate.
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Fact

acknowledges
and

that

Conclusions

it never
of

Law

read

and

the

that

original

they

were

Pursuant to the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals,
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this

Court

desires

to

clarify

its

findings,

conclusions

and

decision based upon the evidence of record.
The

following

Amended

Findings

of

Fact

and

Amended

Conclusions of Law supersede the original findings and conclusions
entered by the court prior to defendants' appeal.
Accordingly,

the

Court

now

makes

and

enters

the

following:
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that the parties' intended to and

did enter into a written contract wherein plaintiff agreed to act
as the general

contractor

and to oversee

the construction

of

defendants' residence in Park City, Utah.
2.

The Court finds that defendant Stanley M. Kurzet

drafted the written contract.
3.

The

Court

finds

that

the

contract

between

the

parties provided that plaintiff would complete construction on
defendants' residence within one year and, in return, defendants
would pay plaintiff $100,000 consideration for plaintiff's general
contractor services in directing and supervising the construction,
and $22 per hour for plaintiff's own hands-on labor.
4.

The

Court

finds

that

the

contract

between

the

parties does not address the measure of damages in the event of
default by either party.
5.
problems

with

The Court
prior

finds that defendants had

contractors

on

the

experienced

residence,

and

that

plaintiff was aware that defendants already had terminated two

236991_1
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earlier

general

contractors

for

unsatisfactory

performance.

Plaintiff was also aware that defendant Stanley M. Kurzet
Kurzet")

was

a meticulous

and

demanding

individual

and

("Mr.
would

require exacting performance of the contract.
6.

The Court finds that plaintiff's employees performed

hands-on labor on the project and were paid for such work by
defendants.

The court also finds that plaintiff commenced acting

in the capacity of general contractor.

Plaintiff received no

compensation for general contractor services.
7.

The Court finds that the parties intended and the

contract provided for plaintiff to provide defendants with evidence
of adequate liability insurance covering its work pursuant to the
contract.

Such evidence of insurance was to have been provided by

plaintiff within 10 days of execution of the contract.
8.

The

Court

finds

that

plaintiff

represented

to

defendants that plaintiff had one million dollars in liability
insurance coverage in force at the time the parties entered into
the contract on July 3, 1990, that defendants wanted four to five
million dollars in coverage, and that plaintiff later discovered
its policy was only for $300,000 coverage, and that the policy had
been canceled on October 24, 1989.
9.

The Court finds that in a memorandum of July 20,

1990 from defendants to plaintiff, which was delivered to Mr. Kent,
defendants notified plaintiff that plaintiff had not yet provided
the necessary certificate evidencing insurance coverage and that
defendants required such evidence under the terms of the contract.

236991_1
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10.

The Court finds that plaintiff did not subsequently

provide the required Certificate of Insurance to defendants.
11.

The

Court

finds

that

defendants

terminated

plaintiff's services on October 2, 1990.
12.

The Court finds that plaintiff did not give the

construction project the attention that was necessary under the
contract.

In particular, the Court finds that plaintiff's attitude

of being on the job, plaintiff's taking care of things in a timely
manner, getting things done, seeing that they were done, seeing
that

things

were

moving

along,

and

answering

subcontractor's

questions were not performed as required.
13.

The Court finds that during the three-month period

that the contract was in effect, Mr. Kent of the plaintiff, was on
the construction site approximately thirty

(3 0) hours per week.

The Court finds that Mr. Kent is not a licensed contractor, and the
duties he performed involved hands-on labor, for which he was paid
in full by defendants.
14.

The

Court

finds that Mr. Richard Allen

of

the

plaintiff was not regularly on the job, but he spoke with Mr.
Kurzet about two times per week by telephone.
15.

The Court finds that during the three-month period

that the contract was in effect, plaintiff performed some general
contractor services including hiring of some subcontractors and
getting bids on retaining walls and windows.

The Court further

finds that these services were inadequately performed, and that the

236991 1
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construction

performed

by

some

of

the

subcontractors

under

plaintiff's direction also was inadequate.
16.

The Court finds that during the time the contract

between plaintiff
progressed

and defendants was in effect, the

residence

from a concrete slab to a point where most of the

framing was complete.

The Court finds that 10% of the construction

project contemplated by the contract was completed during the time
plaintiff was general contractor, regardless of whether plaintiff
performed its duties under the contract.
17.

The

Court

finds

that

defendant

Mr.

Kurzet

was

regularly on the jobsite, as often as much as six (6) hours a day,
and that he personally observed the progress on the home.

The

Court also finds that Mr. Kurzet does not credit plaintiff with
having advanced the construction, but rather credits one of the
subcontractors that Mr. Kurzet hired and that plaintiff approved as
having completed 10% of the residence during the period of time
that plaintiff was general contractor.
18.

The Court finds that after commencing its duties

under the contract, plaintiff

inventoried

and counted all the

lumber at the site which had been ordered by a prior contractor.
The Court finds that plaintiff advised Mr. Kurzet that such lumber
which had been priced at $28,000 was, in fact, worth about $22,500.
Mr. Kurzet instructed plaintiff to offer the vendor $22,500.

The

vendor accepted that amount in settlement of the dispute with
regard to the value of the lumber.

236991_1
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19.

The

court

finds

that

the

duties

of

general

contractor under the Contract did not include counting lumber at
the site which had been ordered by a prior contractor.

The court

finds, however, that plaintiff conferred a benefit on defendants by
counting the lumber and offering a lesser amount in settlement of
the dispute regarding the value of that lumber; that defendants
appreciated

the

benefits

so

conferred

by

plaintiff

in that

defendants acknowledge that they saved $5,500 as a result of
plaintiff performing such services; and that it would be unjust to
allow defendants to retain the benefit without fairly compensating
plaintiff for its services.

The court finds that the reasonable

value of plaintiff's services in counting lumber at the site and
offering the vendor a sum less than the price at which the lumber
had been voiced can be determined by estimating the amount of time
plaintiff spent in performing such services, and awarding plaintiff
an hourly rate of $22 per hour, the rate agreed by the parties to
be payable for on-hands labor. The court finds that 20 hours is a
sufficient

time

for plaintiff

to

spend

counting

lumber

and

negotiating a reduction of the price and that the value of the
benefit conferred on defendants, therefore, is $440.00.
20.
occurred

The Court finds that some construction mistakes

during

the

construction

for

which

plaintiff

was

responsible, causing defendants' subsequent damages for repairs,
etc., in the total amount of $4,359 detailed as follows:

236991_1
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a.

The sum of $1,800 representing the cost of

repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendants' east side
retaining wall;
b.

The sum of $2,000 representing the cost of

repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendant's west side
concrete steps; and
c.

The

sum

of

$559

representing

the

cost

of

plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary "glue-lam" beams.
21.

The Court finds that award to defendants embodied in

the Original Judgment dated October 6, 1992, in the amount of
$4,359.00 was not appealed from, nor was it disturbed on appeal,
nor has it been disturbed by these amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

The Court finds, therefore, that judgment

should be entered Nunc Pro Tunc as of October 6, 1992, in favor of
defendants in the amount of $4,359.00.
interest on said judgment

The Court also finds that

should run at 5.13% from and

after

October 6, 1992 until paid.
22.

The Court finds that plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside

the Court's Prior Order Dismissing the Mechanic's Lien Cause of
Action

and

Resulting

Judgment

for Attorney

Fees

in

Favor

of

Defendants was without justification in law or fact, plaintiff
having not raised that issue on appeal, and that plaintiff had no
cause to bring the motion back before this Court on remand and to
do so was a violation of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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From the foregoing Amended Findings of Fact, the Court
now makes and enters the following
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes that the parties entered into a

valid and binding contract on July 3, 1990 for the construction of
defendants7 residence in Park City, Utah. Under the terms thereof,
plaintiff was obligated to perform certain services and duties as
general contractor, and defendants were obligated to pay plaintiff
an hourly wage for hands-on labor, and $100,000 upon completion of
the project for plaintiff's services as general contractor.
2.

The Court concludes that given the amount of the

contract and the costs of the construction, plaintiff had a duty to
inquire

into

the

adequacy

of

its

insurance

coverage

for

the

project, but did not do so.
3.

The Court concludes that plaintiff's

failure to

promptly provide evidence of adequate liability insurance was a
material breach of the contract.
4.
in

The Court concludes that defendants were justified

terminating

plaintiff's

services

under

the

contract

for

plaintiff's breach of its obligation to promptly provide evidence
of adequate liability insurance.

contract

5.

The Court concludes that, given the amount of the

and

the

fact

that

plaintiff

knew

in

advance

that

defendants would be meticulous, demanding, and would require exact
performance of the contract, plaintiff had a duty to be on the job,

236991 1
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take care of things in a timely manner, answer subcontractor's
questions, and move the construction forward.
6.

The Court concludes that plaintiff's

failure

to

regularly be on the job, take care of things in a timely manner, to
move

the

construction

forward,

and

to

give

the

project

the

attention that was required, was a material breach of the contract.
7.
in

The Court concludes that defendants were justified

terminating

plaintiff's

services

under

the

contract

for

plaintiff's failure to give the construction project the attention
that was required under the contract.
8.

The Court concludes that defendants were not in

breach of the contract in any way.
9.

The Court concludes that because plaintiff had not

substantially completed its duties under the contract at the time
of termination, plaintiff is not entitled to recover under the
contract.
10.
or appreciate

The Court concludes that Mr. Kurzet did not realize
any benefit

as a result

of plaintiff's

general

contractor services, but that Mr. Kurzet credits the efforts of the
subcontractor

hired by Mr. Kurzet with completing

10% of

the

construction during the time the contract was in effect between
plaintiff and defendants.
11.

The Court concludes that although 10% of the project

was completed while plaintiff was acting as general contractor,
that 10% completion was not attributable to plaintiff's efforts.

236991_1
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12.

The

Court

concludes

that

plaintiff

has

not

demonstrated that it conferred any benefit upon defendants through
undertaking

duties

as

general

contractor,

or

that

defendants

realized or appreciated any such benefit.
13.

The Court concludes that under the circumstances,

plaintiff is not entitled to receive any payment from defendants
for

general

contractor

services

based

on

a

theory

of

unjust

enrichment or quantum meruit.
14.

The Court concludes that defendants

suffered no

damage as a result of plaintiff's failure to supply the required
proof of insurance.
any

recovery

As a result, defendants are not entitled to

for

such

The

Court

element

of

plaintiff's

breach

of

the

respect

to

the

contract.
15.

concludes

that

with

inventorying and negotiation of settlement on the disputed prior
lumber

bill,

it was

not

plaintiff's

responsibility

contract to inventory and negotiate such settlements.

under

the

The Court

concludes that plaintiff conferred a benefit on defendant with
respect thereto, that defendants were aware of plaintiff's having
conferred

such benefit, and that it would be unjust to allow

defendants to retain such benefit without payment of a reasonable
fee to plaintiff.
reasonable

fee

for

The Court concludes that $22 an hour is a
inventorying

lumber

and

negotiating

the

reduction in price, and that 2 0 hours would be a reasonable time to
spend

236991_1
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the price

reduction.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that $44 0 is a reasonable sum to
compensate plaintiff for such services.
16.

The

Court

concludes

that

defendants

did

suffer

damages resulting from construction mistakes while plaintiff was
the

general

contractor.

The

damage

resulting

from

such

construction mistakes is $4,359, which represents $1,800 in the
costs of repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of the east side
retaining wall, $2,000 for costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty
construction of the west side concrete steps, and $559 for the
costs of plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary "glue-lam" beams.
17.

The

Court

concludes

that

on

October

6,

defendants were entitled

to $4,359

for damages resulting

1992,

construction mistakes while plaintiff was general contractor.

from
The

Court further concludes that plaintiff did not appeal from that
award of damages, the Court of Appeals did not disturb that award
of damages, an entry of judgment, therefore, is proper as of
October 6, 1992, with interest to run at the rate of 5.13% from and
after that date.
18.

The court concludes that defendants are entitled to

sanctions under Rule 11 for plaintiff having filed its Motion to
Set Aside the Court's Prior Order Dismissing the Mechanic's Lien
Cause of Action and Resulting Judgment For Attorneys' Fees in Favor
of the Defendants.
19.

The Court concludes that defendants are entitled to

post-judgment interest as allowed by law from and after entry of
judgment.
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20.

The Court concludes that plaintiff

is not the

prevailing party in this action and that each party should bear its
own costs of court and attorneys' fees incurred in this action.
21.

The Court concludes that the judgment in favor of

defendants in the amount of $1,937.50 for attorney fees entered by
Judge Glenn Iwasaki on January 23, 1995, is unaffected by these
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
DATED this

day of
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

13

1100

, 1996.

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this p^v^ day of May, 1996, I
caused to be hand-delivered, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing

[DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED] AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to:
Bruce J. Nelson
Allen Nelson Rasmussen & Christensen
215 South State #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM G

No.

11"

FILED

SPENCER E. AUSTIN (0150)
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

MAY

? «96

Clerk of Summit County

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY,' INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

[PROPOSED] AMENDED JUDGMENT

STANLEY M. KURZET, an
Individual; STANLEY M. KURZET
and ANNE L. KURZET, as
Trustees for the Kurzet Family
Trust; THE KURZET FAMILY
TRUST; and JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH
10,

C i v i l No.

90-03-10870

Defendants.
* * * * * * *

This matter was tried to the Court on December 18 and 19,
1991 and on January 30, 1992.

Having considered the evidence,

testimony and exhibits produced at trial, and the arguments of
counsel,

the

Court

entered

its

original

Findings

Conclusions of Law, and Judgment on October 6, 1992.

of

Fact,

Defendants

appealed the Court's findings, conclusions and judgment that were
in favor of plaintiff.

Plaintiff did not appeal those findings,

conclusions and judgment that were in favor of defendants.

On May

24, 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision reversing

237614 1
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y^

this Court's decision in favor of plaintiff and remanding

the

matter to this Court for additional consideration.
On January 23, 1995, Judge Glen Iwasaki of this Court
entered judgment in favor of defendants in the amount of $1,937.50
for attorneys' fees for successfully defending plaintiff's claims
under the Mechanic's Lien and the Bond statutes. On July 25, 1995,
defendants filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc along
with a supporting memorandum.

In response, plaintiff submitted a

Motion for Entry of Additional and Amended Findings of Facts,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment, a Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Entry of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc, and a
Motion

to

Set

Mechanic's

Lien

Aside
Cause

the
of

Court's

Prior

Action

and

Attorneys' Fees in Favor of Defendants.

Order

Resulting

Dismissing

the

Judgment

for

Defendants responded with

a Memorandum in Opposition and a Motion for Sanctions under Rule
11.

On November 21, 1995, this Court heard and considered oral

argument by counsel for the parties on issues relating to all of
the motions and memoranda submitted from and after July 25, 1995.
The

Court,

having

considered

the

motions,

memoranda

and

all

supporting papers of the parties, and having heard oral argument on
those motions on November 21, 1995, and having reconsidered its
original

findings,

conclusions

and

judgment

pursuant

to

the

direction of the Utah Court of Appeals' decision dated May 24,
1994, the Court, having now entered its Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

237614_1
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1.
6,

1992,

Defendants are hereby granted judgment as of October

against

represents

plaintiffs

in

the

amount

of

$4,359,

$1,800 in the cost of repairing plaintiff's

which
faulty

construction of the eastside retaining wall, plus $2,000 for costs
in

repairing

plaintiff's

faulty

construction

of

the

westside

concrete steps, plus $559 for the costs of plaintiff's ordering
three unnecessary "glue-lam" beams.
2.

The award to defendants is offset by a credit to

plaintiff in the amount of $440 representing the reasonable value
of plaintiff's services involving negotiations for payment of a
disputed lumber bill incurred by a prior contractor.
3.

Defendants are entitled to interest on said judgment

at 5.13 percent per annum from and after October 6, 1992.
4.
reasonable

Defendants

attorney's

are

awarded

fee incurred

$500

representing

a

in preparing a response

to

plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the Court's Prior Order Dismissing
the Mechanic's Lien Cause of Action and Resulting Judgment for
Attorneys' Fees in Favor of Defendants, which motion was filed in
violation of Rule 11.
5.

The judgment in favor of defendants in the amount of

$1,937.50 entered against plaintiff January 23, 1995, by Judge Glen
Iwasaki relating to attorney's fees and costs, it is unaffected by
this Judgment.

All of plaintiff's remaining causes of action and

all of defendants' remaining counterclaims are hereby dismissed
with prejudice.

237614_1

3

ll0*r

DATED this

day of

, 1996

BY THE COURT:

Homer F. Wilkinson, Third District
Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Bruce J. Nelson
Attorney for Plaintiff

Spencer E. Austin
William J. Evans
Attorneys for Defendants

237614
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this w\^
caused

to be hand-delivered,

a true

and

day of May, 1996, I
correct

foregoing [PROPOSED] AMENDED JUDGMENT to:
Bruce J. Nelson
Allen Nelson Rasmussen & Christensen
215 South State #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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copy of

the

ADDENDUM H

ORIGINAL
8523

l
2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

3

IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

#%Ol <&

4
5

BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC.,
PLAINTIFF,

6
7

VS.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF
HEARING ON MOTIONS FOR
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS; ENTRY
OF JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC;
AND RULE 11 SAKCXLQMS.

F l LE D

81 STANLEY M. KURZET, AN INDIVIDUAL; STANLEY M. KURZET AND
ANNE L. KURZET, AS TRUSTEES FOR:
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; THE
10 i KURZET FAMILY TRUST; AND JOHN :
DOES 1-10,
11
DEFENDANTS.
12

DEC 2 0 1995

9

ClerKot Summit Uounty

Jtrffl -

By.
Deputy Clerk

CASE NO. 900310870 CV
HON. HOMER F. WILKINSON

13
BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 21ST DAY OF
14
NOVEMBER. 1995. THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR
15
HEARING IN COURTROOM NO. 502 OF THE COURTS BUILDING,
16
METROPOLITAN HALL OF JUSTICE, 240 EAST 400 SOUTH, SALT LAKE CITY,
17
UTAH, BEFORE THE HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, JUDGE IN THE
18
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH.
19
APPEARANCES
20
BRUCE J. NELSON. ATTORNEY-AT-LAW. ALLEN NELSON
21

RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN, 215 SOUTH STATE, SUITE 900, SALT LAKE
22

CITY, UTAH 84111 TELEPHONE 531-8400 APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE
23

PLAINTIFF.
24

SPENCER E. AUSTIN. ATTORNEY-AT-LAW. PARSONS
25
BEHLE & LATIMER, 201 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 1800, POST OFFICE

1UU

1

OPINION THAT WHAT I GRANTED FOUR YEARS AGO, WHAT I DID WAS

2

CORRECT.

3

I'M STILL OF THAT OPINION. OF COURSE ANY

4

MODIFICATIONS TO THE LUMBER CONTRACT, AS FAR AS THAT IS

5

CONCERNED, I THINK THE POINT IS WELL TAKEN, THAT I THINK BOTH

6

PARTIES HAVE THE BENEFIT OF THAT.

7

AS FAR AS THE MOTION NUNC PRO TUNC, I THINK

8

THAT BECOME MOOT. THAT BECOMES PART OF MY DECISION AGAIN,

9

MY JUDGMENT. I THINK THE INTEREST BEGINS TO RUN ON BOTH OF

10

THEM AT THE SAME TIME, AND THAT IT'S THERE. I THINK HFS STILL

11

ENTITLED TO THAT OFFSET, BUT I WOULD NOT GRANT A SEPARATE

12

JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC WHERE THEY COULD RECEIVE WITHOUT

13

THE BENEFIT OF THE OFFSET.

14

OF COURSE THE PLAINTIFF HAS WITHDRAWN HIS

15

MOTION REGARDING THE MECHANIC'S LIEN. THE PLAINTIFF HAS ASKED

16

FOR SANCTIONS--

17

MR. NELSON: THE DEFENDANT, YOUR HONOR?

18

THE COURT: I'M SORRY, THE DEFENDANT ASKED FOR

19

SANCTIONS. WELL, THIS GETS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. I DON'T THINK

20

THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION--I AGREE WITH THE DEFENDANT THAT

21

THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION, WHEN THEY DID NOT APPEAL, THAT HE HAD

22

ANY CAUSE TO BRING THE MOTION BACK BEFORE THE COURT, AND

23

THAT THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPEALED. THERE'S NO DOUBT IN THE

24

COURT'S MIND ON THAT.

25

WHETHER I WAS OR NOT IN THAT, I THINK I WAS, BUT
51
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1

I DON'T REMEMBER WHY I RULED THAT WAY NOW, BUT I THINK I WAS

2

RIGHT.

3

THE ONLY THING THE PLAINTIFF WENT TO WAS

4

HAVING TO FILE I GUESS A MEMORANDUM STATING THAT IT WAS ON

5

APPEAL OR THAT HE SHOULD HAVE ASKED FOR IT ON APPEAL. I DON'T

6

THINK THAT ADDITIONAL TIME WAS SPENT THERE TODAY.

7

I THINK THE ATTORNEYS WOULD BE--THE ATTORNEYS

8

FEES WOULD BE VERY NOMINAL. THE COURT OF COURSE-AND I'M

9

SAYING THIS, TOO: I HAVE SAID THIS, BUT I'M GOING TO SAY IT AGAIN,

10

THAT I THINK THE DEFENDANT WAS WRONG--AND I'M NOT OVERRULING

11

IT; IT'S NOT BEFORE ME--I THINK HE WAS WRONG IN BRINGING THE

12

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS BEFORE AN ADDITIONAL JUDGE, AND I NOTED

13

THAT COUNSEL ARGUED IT WAS IMPROPER.

14

AND OF COURSE THE COURT PROCEEDED. I'M NOT

15

FINDING FAULT WITH THE DEFENDANT FOR GETTING THE AWARD; THE

16

JUDGE SAW FIT TO ORDER IT, BUT I THINK IT WAS IMPROPER FOR HIM

17

TO BRING IT BEFORE HIM.

18

BUT IN A CASE OF THIS TYPE, AND MAYBE TO SAVE

19

ATTORNEYS FEES, THE ATTORNEYS -J&OULD OFFSET EACH OTHER ON

20

THAT. YOU COULD SAY--I GUESS WHAT I'M SAYING IS THAT THIS CASE

21

HAS GONE ON TOO MUCH AS FAR AS TOO MUCH IT SEEMS LIKE IN

22

PERSONALITIES. I'M GOING TO DENY THE MOTION FOR SANCTIONS. I

23

JUST DON'T THINK THAT THEY'RE NECESSARY AS FAR AS THE CASE IS

24

CONCERNED. ANY QUESTIONS?

25||

MR. NELSON: I THINK YOU HAVE BEEN CLEAR, BUT I
52
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ADDENDUM I

Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers;
sanctions.
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's address
also shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign
his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature
of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, jsrhich may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)

